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Articles
Passing the Confrontation Clause Stop
Sign: Is All Hearsay Constitutionally
Admissible?
BY JOANNE A. EPPS*
INTRODUCTION
The future. A criminal courtroom. Anytown, U.S.A. The pros-
ecution calls a witness who testifies that seconds after a murder
the sole eyewitness frantically related the incident and identi-
fied the defendant as the perpetrator. At the time this testi-
mony is introduced, the eyewitness is sitting in the courthouse
lobby reading a magazine.
This is an Article about the confrontation clause,1 the use of
hearsay evidence; in a criminal case, and whether the former in
any way limits the latter. In order to decide if the confrontation
clause indeed limits the introduction of hearsay, it is necessary to
understand the issue, the context, and the problem.
The issue, exemplified by the scenario above, is whether hear-
say evidence can be introduced when the declarant is available to
* Assistant Professor, Temple University School of Law; J.D., Yale University
School of Law, 1976. The author expresses sincere gratitude to Professors Anthony
Bocchino and David Sonenshein for their ideas, insight, and encouragement; to Professors
Jane Barron, Richard Greenstein, and Mark Rahdert for their special help in critiquing
early drafts; and to the many other Temple professors who provided comments on drafts
of this Article. The author also wishes to thank John Carlton and Stewart Lapayowker
for their research assistance. Finally, grateful appreciation is extended to Temple University
School of Law for its financial support for this Article.
The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides, inter alia, "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness
against him. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
2 See infra notes 21-41 and accompanying text.
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testify but simply is not called as a witness. The context of this
problem is provided by the confrontation clause and the eviden-
tiary rules regarding hearsay. The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution gives accused persons the right to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against them. The law of evidence
allows certain out-of-court statements to be repeated in court.
Where the witness on the stand is repeating his or her own prior
statements, as would be the case if the eyewitness in our opening
scenario had been called to repeat the statements made at the
murder scene, there is no confrontation problem.' By hypothesis,
the defendant is confronting the declarant of the statement, giving
both the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
concerning the prior statements and the finder of fact the oppor-
tunity to observe the declarant's demeanor while testifying. The
problem arises when the hearsay declarant does not testify, but
instead, another witness seeks to repeat in court the declarant's
earlier statements. In these situations, the declarant cannot be
cross-examined nor can the declarant's demeanor be observed.
Accordingly, it is in these situations that the Supreme Court has
had to decide if the confrontation clause imposes any limitation
on the introduction of hearsay.
Until recently, most 4 of the cases the Supreme Court decided
involved hearsay declarants who were not available to testify.5 In
these cases, the Court ruled that the confrontation clause permits
the introduction of hearsay if its reliability is sufficient to comport
with the original truth-seeking function of the confrontation
clause. 6 In contrast to those cases where the declarant was either
' The admissibility of the out-of-court statements of a witness present and able to
be cross-examined may raise an evidentiary hearsay problem, but it does not constitute a
confrontation clause problem. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
4 The one significant case in this area to reach the Supreme Court in which the
declarant arguably was available but not produced was Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970). See generally infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text. In California v. Green,
another arguable exception, the declarant was either present or unavailable. Green, 399
U.S. at 168-69.
1 Although some were technically produced, they did not testify and, thus, would
have met prevailing definitions of unavailability. For a discussion of legal unavailability,
see infra note 30. The cases were Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1958).
6 See infra notes 55-110 and accompanying text.
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actually or legally unavailable to testify,7 recent cases have squarely
raised the issue of what is constitutionally required when the
declarant is not produced but is nonetheless available. Ultimately,
these cases present the following questions: Where the declarant
is available, does the confrontation clause require that person to
be produced? Or is the issue constitutionally indistinguishable
from the case where production is not possible, in which event
the sole requirement is that the statement meet articulated stan-
dards of reliability?"
The distinction between requiring or not requiring production
is important because it determines the means by which the relia-
bility of a declarant's out-of-court statement is tested. Production
of an available declarant, the essence of confrontation, allows
reliability to be tested in the purest and fullest form. The witness
testifies under oath and is subject to cross-examination. Moreover,
the factfmder can determine from the witness' demeanor whether
that person is worthy of belief. Admitting hearsay evidence of a
non-produced but available declarant, on the other hand, based
solely on a finding that the hearsay is of likely reliability, essen-
tially erects an irrebuttable presumption that the statement is
reliable enough to dispense with testing it through confrontation,
thereby depriving the defendant of any chance to prove unrelia-
bility. Yet this deprivation occurs in the face of a constitutional
provision, the goal of which is to augment and enhance accuracy
and truth-seeking in criminal trials. 9
In recent cases, the Court has suggested that if hearsay is
sufficiently reliable, an available witness need not be produced
even though that person could be produced.10 According to the
Court, hearsay is sufficiently reliable if the hearsay exception is
a firmly-rooted one."
The Court's approach is problematic in that not only does it
open the door to results such as the one in our opening scenario,
it is analytically unpersuasive. It treats as constitutionally identical
the disparate situations typified by the three "places" a hearsay
7 See infra notes 30, 67 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
9 United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986).
o Id. at 395.
" Bourjaily v. United States, -U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987).
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declarant could be at the time the prosecution seeks to use that
declarant's testimony: dead (unavailable), testifying (produced),
or in the courthouse lobby reading (available but not produced). 12
While this reductionist approach may have the appeal of simplic-
ity, the considerations warranting the admission of hearsay where
production of the declarant is an option differ from those where
production of the declarant is not an option. Where production
is not an option, the choice is between the admission of the
hearsay or no evidence at all. Where, however, the declarant is
available, that availability changes the stakes. The need to choose
between the hearsay and no evidence no longer exists. The de-
clarant can be produced and the hearsay can be admitted.
This Article argues that there is a constitutional distinction
between those situations where the declarant is legally unavailable
and those where the declarant is available but simply not pro-
duced. Where the declarant can be produced, thereby permitting
the reliability of the out-of-court statement to be tested in front
of the finder of fact, reliance on substitute indicia of reliability
is unnecessary and therefore inappropriate. Requiring the declar-
ant to be produced both serves and fosters the confrontation
clause's goal of augmenting the accuracy of the fact-finding proc-
ess. It does this by changing the test from one that admits evidence
simply because the indicia surrounding its making suggest that it
is reliable, to the test preferred by the Constitution: confronta-
tion.' 3 Confrontation, in turn, provides what no alternative meas-
ures of reliability can ever supply: it forces the witness to testify
under oath and to submit to cross-examination. Moreover, and
perhaps most importantly, confrontation allows the trier of fact
to judge from the witness' demeanor whether the testimony is
actually worthy of belief.
Part I of the Article describes the fragile, and hence problem-
atic, relationship between the confrontation clause and the evi-
dentiary hearsay rules. In Part II, the Article traces the Court's
interpretation of this relationship, analyzes how the Court has
come to its most recent resolution of the conflict between the
12 For purposes of this Article, "produced" implies that the witness is testifying and
available for cross-examination, not just present in court.
13 See supra note 1.
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confrontation clause and the hearsay rules, and advances a theory
of why its current resolution is at odds with the confrontation
clause. Specifically, Part II points out that most of the cases
reaching the Court involved prior testimony. As a result, the
Court increasingly overemphasized the importance of cross-ex-
amination without recognizing that the value of cross-examination
in cases where confrontation is not possible is different from its
value in cases where confrontation is possible. Where confronta-
tion is not possible, prior cross-examination is a suitable but not
exclusive test of reliability; where confrontation is possible, cross-
examination in front of the finder of fact is an integral and
required pax, o. conbrontation. Once the Court realized that the
historically-unchallenged admissibility of dying declarations was
doctrinally inconsistent with the notion of cross-examination as a
sine qua non of reliability, the Court retreated. In so doing,
however, the Court dispensed with a requirement of cross-exam-
ination both in cases of necessity, where alternative indicia of
reliability are constitutionally permissible, as well as in cases of
no necessity, where because cross-examination is possible, reliance
on alternative indicia of reliability is impermissible. The inevi-
tablity of this result does not make it valid.
Part III of the Article proposes as an alternative to the Court's
current resolution of the problem a requirement that available
witnesses be produced. Before our hypothetical magazine reader's
hearsay statements could be introduced,' 4 that person would have
to be produced in court to testify. Far from being radical, such
a rule would give due regard to precedent and, at the same time,
would further the true meaning of the confrontation clause. An
Epilogue to the Article suggests that the proposed change would
also better serve the values of the Constitution as a whole.
I. UNDERSTANDING TH MEANGS OF "HEARSAY" AND "THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE"
To evaluate fairly the tension between the confrontation clause
and hearsay, it is necessary first to realize that the two concepts
are similar yet distinct. Only then is it possible to assess whether
14 As described, the statements could be introduced as an excited utterance pursuant
to FED. R. Evio. 803(2).
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in criminal cases the confrontation clause limits the use of hearsay.
A. The Rule Against Hearsay-Older than the Confrontation
Clause Itself
Hearsay is generally defined as any out-of-court statement
offered for the truth of its contents.'5 For evidentiary purposes, 16
hearsay includes statements that the testifying witness made before
coming to court as well as statements of others that the testifying
witness plans to repeat.' 7 The completed definition of hearsay
makes explicit the implicit: in order to believe that the original
declarant's statement is true, the factfinder must accordingly rely
on that declarant's credibility. 18 Where the original declarant does
not testify, this is difficult. 19 For this reason, hearsay is not
" See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 801(c); see also infra note 20. An interesting issue, though
beyond the scope of this Article, involves the effect, if any, of an out-of-court statement
that contains no express assertion of fact but rather relies for its value on inferences
contained in the statement. See generally Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (raising
the possibility that this eases the tension that might otherwise exist between the confron-
tation clause and the admission of out-of-court statements).
16 Although the confrontation clause and the hearsay rules are generally designed to
protect similar values, they are not totally congruent. See California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 155 (1970). The rule against hearsay, which predates this nation's confrontation clause,
was and remains a rule of evidence, definable by Congress. United States v. Ragghianti,
560 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1977). The confrontation clause, of course, represents a
constitutional provision, enforceable by the courts.
FED. R. Evim. 801(c).
,S G. LILLY, AN INTRODucnON TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 121 (2d ed. 1987). In Ohio
v. Roberts, the Supreme Court quotes McCormick who, with the caveat, "[s]implification
has a measure of falsification," defined hearsay evidence as "testimony in court, or written
evidence, or a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to
show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 n.4 (1980)
(quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 246 at 724 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984)); see also Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 581 (1884) (Hearsay "denotes that kind of evidence which does
not derive its value solely from the credit to be given to the witness himself but rests, also,
in part, on the veracity and competency of some other person.") (citing 1 Greenleaf,
TREATISE ON TE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 99; 1 Phil. Ev. 169). The last phrase, most often
omitted in casual references to hearsay, points out the importance of evaluating the
reliability of the out-of-court statement; see also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 n.4
(1986). For a history of the hearsay rule and its exceptions, see generally McCopaMcK ON
EVIDENCE, supra § 244, at 725 (hearsay rule), §§ 254-324, at 759-912 (exceptions).
19 The credibility of a hearsay declarant may be challenged by impeaching evidence
made admissible pursuant to FED. R. EvnD. 806.
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generally admissible as evidence.20 Thus, the hearsay rule is ac-
tually a rule of exclusion, and it is only through its now numerous
exceptions that hearsay evidence is admissible.
21
Although the precise date is not known, by the late 1600s
hearsay had become a recognized form of evidence.? The general
rule of exclusion developed in response to two types of practices.
The first, which continues today, involved witness A who on the
stand repeats statements made at an earlier time by witness B.
This practice tended to be casual and the hearsay oral.2 The
second involved a practice, not in use today, of admitting at trial
the transcribed earlier statements of a witness not produced at
trial. Typically, these statements were made under oath, usually
before a judge or other court officer sometime prior to the trial,
but were made in a non-adversary setting; the testimony was not,
therefore, subject to cross-examination by the party against whom
it was offered.24 Even though this practice was formal and written,
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination made it offensive.
In response to these and other abuses inherent in admitting
hearsay evidence, early Anglo-American jurisprudence established
three conditions for eliciting evidence: the witness should testify
under oath (or affirmation), the witness should be personally
present at trial, and the witness should be subject to cross-ex-
20FD. R. Evn. 802 (Rule 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court .. ")
21 Rules 803 and 804 codify the federal exceptions to the general rule against hearsay.
FED. R. EvrD. 803-804.
- Wigmore places the date as somewhere between 1675 and 1690. 5 J. WtoRal,
EVIDENCE, § 1364 at 18 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
21 This is McCormick's phrasing. MCCORMCK ON EVIDENCE supra note 18, § 244 at
725. Casual oral hearsay is meant to exclude those situations where a witness on the stand
appears for the sole purpose of reading into the record the prior recorded testimony of
some other witness. This latter occurrence, though existent, was subject to less error and
was hence less troublesome than the repeating of casual oral hearsay.
- See generally 5 J. WIoMoan, supra note 22, § 1364, at 20-21. Perhaps the most
famous example of this practice arose in the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Charged
with high treason Sir Walter was convicted solely upon the admission into evidence of a
document purporting to represent the confession of Lord Cobham, an alleged co-conspir-
ator. Cobham, of course, was not produced. Despite efforts by Sir Walter to show that
Cobham had later recanted, the confession was used against Raleigh. He was convicted
and beheaded. The account of these events is taken from Graham, The Right of Confron-
tation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CIUa. L. BULL.
99, 100 (1972), which provides an excellent account of the case.
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amination.2 At first blush, these requirements appear to demand
the exclusion of all hearsay. In reality, however, exceptions to the
hearsay rule began evolving as soon as the rule itself was devel-
oped.2 Thus, although a preference was evolving for live testi-
mony given under oath and subject to cross-examination, there
was a simultaneous acknowledgement that in certain circum-
stances this preference should yield to the admission of hearsay
evidence.
From the time of the origin of the states until the middle of
this century, the principles governing the admission of hearsay
existed as common law. Though there were consistent themes, the
several states and the federal government relied on their own
perceptions of their respective common law to formulate rules of
evidence. 27 By the mid 1900s, however, momentum had grown to
codify the rules of evidence. After several drafts, Congress in
1975 enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, followed in whole
or in part by similar action in most of the states.U
The Federal Rules and jurisdictions following this model con-
tinue the common law doctrine of excluding hearsay as a general
principle. 29 Exceptions to the rule fall into two groups. In one
25 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules of Evidence.
Perhaps the most vivid example is the dying declaration. The original justification
for the admission of dying declarations has carried over for centuries. It rests both on the
fact that unavailability of the declarant creates a sense of necessity as well as on the notion
that the declarant's expectation of almost certain death would remove any temptation to
lie. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 152 (1892). Whether the latter justification
is equally persuasive today may be questioned; when first recognized, however, generally
held religious beliefs made it unlikely that anyone would choose to meet his maker with a
lie on his lips. The dying declaration is believed to be the only extant exception to the
hearsay rule at the time the sixth amendment was ratified. F. HELLER, TEE SIXT AMEND-
mENT 22-24, 105 n.6 (1951); see also J. WIGMoRE, supra note 22, § 1397, at 158-59.
27 Packel, Symposium, Federal Rules of Evidence: A Decade Later (Introduction),
30 VIL. L. Rnv. 1313, 1313 (1985).
11 Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30
Vin. L. Ray. 1315, 1319-21 (1985). The following states have evidence codes or rules of
court based wholly or substantially on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. G. LILY, supra note 18, at xxv.
2 FED. R. EviD. 802. For purposes of this Article, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are illustrative. The thesis of this Article applies to any jurisdiction following the model
set by the Federal Rules.
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group hearsay will be admitted only if the out-of-court declarant
is not available;30 if the declarant is available, these exceptions
are inapplicable and the hearsay evidence will be excluded under
the general rule." In contrast, hearsay exceptions in the other
group are not affected by the availability of the declarant;
32
hearsay evidence of this type will be admitted regardless of whether
the declarant is dead, present and testifying, or reading in the
courthouse lobby.
From a purely evidentiary standpoint, the hearsay admissible
under both groups of exceptions is presumed to be reliable.3 3 The
distinction between the groups rests on the relative reliability of
the hearsay. Hearsay admitted irrespective of the declarant's avail-
ability is assumed to be as trustworthy as testimony from the
declarant, rendering irrelevant the possibility that the declarant
could testify in person? 4 Hearsay admitted only when the declar-
ant is unavailable continues the common law belief that this type
of hearsay is not as trustworthy as live testimony. 3 It possesses
In pertinent part, Rule 804 provides, "The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... " FP. R. EviD. 804.
Unavailability, for purposes of this rule, includes situations where the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order from the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or
testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. Evm. 804(a).
31 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
12 Rule 803 states, in pertinent part, "The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . ." FaD. R. EvI. 803. Rule
803 proceeds upon the premise that the circumstances surrounding the making of a hearsay
statement may provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of sufficient persua-
siveness to justify the admission of the statement at trial without requiring the production
of an available declarant. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules of Evidence.
11 See G. LrLLY, supra note 18, at 283-84.
14 Id. at 283.
11 Id. at 284.
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sufficient reliability to be admitted, but only if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
In addition to the two groups of hearsay exceptions, the
Federal Rules and jurisdictions following its lead exclude entirely
some statements from the definition of hearsay. 6 Statements of
co-conspirators made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy,
and party admissions, are but two examples. 37 In contrast to
hearsay exceptions, presumed reliability is not the basis of admit-
ting hearsay exclusions. Hearsay exclusions are admissible because
to do so is consistent with the Anglo-American adversary system's
tenet of allowing a party considerable freedom in prescribing the
course of litigation while enforcing the consequences of an ad-
versary's mistakes. 38 Thus, although for purposes of confrontation
clause analysis the Supreme Court has perceived no distinction
between hearsay exclusions and exceptions, 39 admitting evidence
under the hearsay exclusions without an opportunity for cross-
36 Rule 801(d) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if -
(1) Prior statement by witness
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition,
or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. Evm. 801(d). These are often referred to as hearsay exclusions.
3 Id.
" See G Lmuy, supra note 18, at 209-10.
31 For purposes of comparison with the mandates of the confrontation clause, the
distinction between evidentiary exclusions and exceptions to the hearsay rule is a distinction
without a difference. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 398 n.12 (1986). Accord-
ingly, although the Article will refer to exceptions, its thesis applies equally to exclusions.
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examination is especially troublesome since exclusions derived
from concerns wholly unrelated to reliability.
Moreover, although hearsay exceptions may be based on ra-
tional judgments about the presumed reliability of particular kinds
of hearsay evidence, all they represent are presumptions. Con-
frontation, of the constitutional variety, permits these presump-
tions to be tested in individual cases. If there is a constitutional
preference that the reliability of hearsay be tested rather than
presumed, that preference is not served by the Rules of Evidence.
4
0
Recently, the Supreme Court has ruled both that the confronta-
tion clause requires nothing more than that hearsay be reliable,
and that reliability is satisfied if the particular hearsay exception
is "firmly rooted.' ' 4 It is with these conclusions that this Article
takes issue.
B. The Adoption of the Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clause provides that "[iun all criminal pro-
secutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him ... "42 Though of apparent plain
meaning, these words are nevertheless problematic. For example,
from these words one could reasonably conclude that in all crim-
inal cases, 43 a defendant would have the right to meet face-to-
face those persons from whose lips pass incriminating evidence.
But this is not true now nor has it ever been so. For it is
undisputed that at the time of the adoption of the sixth amend-
ment, 44 there already existed at least one exception to the hearsay
40 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
4 Bourjaily v. United States, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2783 (1987); see
infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
,2 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
' For other sixth amendment purposes, the phrase "criminal prosecutions" has been
interpreted to mean that stage of the proceedings when formal judicial proceedings have
commenced and, accordingly, the adversary roles have solidified. Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 684-91 (1972). Because the focus of this Article is on the conflict generated by
the introduction of hearsay testimony at trial which, of necessity, follows the Kirby
"initiation of proceedings" test, the phrase "criminal case" will be used to denote those
situations where the confrontation clause is applicable.
" The amendment was adopted in 1787. Nearly every state constitution has a similar
provision. Those with identical provisions are Alabama (Art. I, § 6); Alaska (Art. I, § 11);
Arkansas (Art. II, § 10) (1874); Connecticut (Art. I, § 8) (1965); Georgia (Art. I, § I)
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rule.45 So while empirical proof is lacking, no one has seriously
advanced the proposition that the confrontation clause was meant
to exclude all hearsay. 41
Much less is known about the history surrounding the adop-
tion of the confrontation clause than is known of the codification
of the hearsay rule. 47 Both scholars and courts agree, however,
that at a minimum the confrontation clause was a reaction to the
particularly odious practice of trial by anonymous, and hence
absent, witnesses. 48 Because the confrontation clause was passed
with little congressional debate, any additional "intent" has been
ascribed by later courts and scholars. 49 Thus, to a much greater
(1945); Hawaii (Art. I, § 14) (1950, amended 1959 and 1968); Iowa (Art. I, § 10) (1857);
Louisiana (Art. I, § 16) (1921); Maine (Art. I, § 6) (1820); Maryland (Declaration of
Rights, Right 21) (1867); Michigan (Art. I, § 20) (1964); Minnesota (Art. I, § 6) (1857);
Mississippi (Art. 3, § 26) (1890); New Jersey (Art. I, par. 10) (1947); New Mexico (Art.
II, § 14) (1912); New York (Art. I, § 6) (1895); Oklahoma (Art. II, § 20) (1907); Rhode
Island (Art. I, § 10) (1843); South Carolina (Art. I, § 18) (1895); Texas (Art. I, § 10)
(1876); Utah (Art. I, § 12) (1896); Virginia (Art. I, § 8) (rev. 1971); West Virginia (Art.
III, § 14) (1872); Wyoming (Art. I, § 10) (1890). Those with similar provisions are: Arizona
(Art. II, § 24) (1912) ("... to meet the witness against him face to face . . ."); accord,
Colorado (Art. II, § 16) (1876); Delaware (Art. I, § 7) (1897); Florida (Art. I, § 16) (1968);
Illinois (Art. I, § 8) (1970); Indiana (Art. I, § 13) (1851); Kansas (Bill of Rights, § 10)
(1861); Kentucky (Bill of Rights, § 11) (1891); Massachusetts (Art. XII, Part I) (1780);
Missouri (Art. I, § 18(a)) (1945); Montana (Art. II, § 24) (1889); Nebraska (Art. I, § 11)
(1875); New Hampshire (Art. 15, Part I) (1784); North Carolina (Art. I, § 11) (1868);
Ohio (Art. I, § 10) (1851); Oregon (Art. I, § 11) (1859); Pennsylvania (Art. I, § 9) (1874);
South Dakota (Art. VI, § 7) (1889); Tennessee (Art. I, § 9) (1870); Vermont (Ch. I, Art.
10) (1793); Washington (Art. I, § 22) (1889); Wisconsin (Art. I, § 7) (1848).
41 See supra note 26.
46 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 80.
47 Green, 399 U.S. at 176 & n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring). In all of the discussion of
the various rights, there was no specific discussion of the right of confrontation. R.
RuTrND, THE BrTH OF THE Br- OF RiGHTs 202-217 (1955); see also J. MAiN, THE ANT-
FEDERALss, CRICS OF THE CONSTM ON, 1781-1788 (1961); Baker, The Right to Con-
frontation, the Hearsay Rules and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When
Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. Ray. 529, 532 & n.15 (1974);
Graham, supra note 24, at 104.
" See Green, 399 U.S. at 156; Arenson, The Confrontation Clause: Where Will the
Supreme Court Take Us?, 12 S.U.L. Rnv. 15, 16 (1985); Baker, supra note 47, at 532; E.
CoKE, TaE SECOND PART OF THE INsTrruTEs 611 (1662) ("... [A]nd where the objection
seemeth to impeach the trial at the Common Law by Jurors, we hold, and shall be able
to approve it to be a farre better course for matter of fact upon the testimony of witnesses
sworn viva voce, then upon the conscience of any one particular man, being guided by
paper-proofs .... ").
," See supra note 47 and accompanying text. In fact, it took more than a century
for the first case involving the relationship between the confrontation clause and the
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extent than is true with other constitutional provisions, the con-
frontation clause is what the Supreme Court says it is: no more,
no less.
The problematic relationship between the evidentiary hearsay
exceptions and the confrontation clause is most sharply demon-
strated by attempting to answer the following question: If the
confrontation clause contemplates the admission of some types
of hearsay, what types of hearsay may be admitted and under
what circumstances? The tension between the evidentiary rules
and the constitutional mandate has crystallized over the years as
the Supreme Court struggled to answer this question, while at the
same time trying to leave the states free to formulate their own
rules of evidence. 50
II. TBE MEANING IMPOSED ON THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
In modeling the contours of the relationship between the
confrontation clause and hearsay, the Court has worked in the
context of the particular cases before it. Until recently, all the
significant cases but one involved either a hearsay exception which
required declarant unavailability or hearsay statements of a de-
clarant who was in fact unavailable. 51 These settings produced
two developments of significance, one affirmative, one an omis-
sion. The affirmative result was that the Court attached increasing
importance to, and finally held constitutionally required, a defen-
dant's opportunity for cross-examination as determinative of a
hearsay statement's reliability, and hence, admissibility.52 This
resulted in part from the declarants' unavailability to be cross-
examined about their earlier statements and in part from the types
hearsay rule to reach the Supreme Court. That case was Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237 (1895). It was not until the confrontation clause was held applicable to the states in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965), that confrontation and hearsay cases arrived
at the Court with any regularity; see infra notes 62-120 and accompanying text.
10 See Green, 399 U.S. at 171 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For a representative list of
sources regarding the origin and development of the hearsay rules and the confrontation
clause, see id. at 156 n.9.
51 The one exception was Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See infra notes 91-
100 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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of hearsay at issue.53 The omission involved the Court's failure
to question whether the declarants' availability would have af-
fected the Court's analysis, again a direct result of the fact that
none of the cases presented this possibility.
Recently, the Court decided that by holding a defendant's
right of cross-examination to be constitutionally required, it had
overstated the rule. It then abandoned the requirement entirely,
substituting in its place a general requirement of reliability, 4 of
which cross-examination is a suitable, but by no means exclusive,
measure. Yet, because the Court had never identified declarant
availability as a matter of constitutional significance, it had over-
looked the fact that the confrontation clause's preference for live
testimony would render cross-examination required when the de-
clarant is available even if cross-examination is not required when
the declarant is not available. Thus, the Court switched abruptly
from an absolute requirement of cross-examination to no require-
ment. In doing so, the Court failed to see the constitutional stop
sign posted where a hearsay declarant is available to be confronted
by the accused.
A. The Evolving Misconception of the Importance of Cross-
Examination
More than a hundred years passed after the adoption of the
confrontation clause before the Supreme Court was called upon
to consider what the right of confrontation truly meant in relation
to the admission of hearsay evidence. 5 That opportunity came ini
1 Typically the hearsay was the confession of a co-defendant which, unlike a
statement of a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, is considered
highly unreliable. "Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate
himself, a co-defendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible
than ordinary hearsay evidence." Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (quoting Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). Of course the Court
was influenced by the prior testimony cases it had decided, where it had implicitly found
the opportunity for cross-examination to be constitutionally required. See Mattox, 156
U.S. at 249; Pointer, 380 U.S. 400; infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Bourjaily v. United States, - U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 2775, 2782-83 (1987); see
also infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
51 The meaning of the confrontation clause is not restricted to its relationship with
the hearsay rule, although it is to this relationship that this Article is addressed. The
confrontation clause has also been interpreted as imposing a general bar against the
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Mattox v. United States.s Mattox involved the retrial of a murder
case, the first conviction having been set aside and an order for
a new trial entered. At the retrial, the trial judge admitted tran-
scribed copies of the testimony of two witnesses from the earlier
trial, both of whom had died in the intervening time. 57 On the
premise that the confrontation clause was satisfied by the full
cross-examination that had occurred at the first trial, the Supreme
Court upheld use of the transcript.
5
1
Mattox is important for what it stands for as well as for what
it does not. It stands for the narrow proposition that where the
declarant is unavailable, admission of a prior statement, given
under oath and subject to cross-examination, does not offend the
confrontation clause. What Mattox did not address was why this
was so.
One interpretation of the decision is that the confrontation
clause requires confrontation but is satisfied if the confrontation
occurred at a time earlier than, or in a forum different from, the
trial at issue. Real confrontation, however, has three components:
the witness testifies under oath, is forced to submit to cross-
restriction of cross-examination. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974)
(right of cross-examination is a constitutional right that states may not legislatively restrict);
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-21 (1986) (per curiam); authorities collected in
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
- 156 U.S. 237 (1895). This was not the first time that Mattox's case reached the
Supreme Court. In an earlier opinion the Supreme Court had approved the use of dying
declarations in homicide cases to prove both the fact of the homicide as well as the person
by whom the homicide was committed. Because, factually, the first Mattox case presented
the question whether a dying declaration was admissible on behalf of the defendant, which
the Court answered in the affirmative, the opinion never mentioned the confrontation
clause. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892). For a summary of the English and
state cases prior to the second Mattox case, see Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240-41.
"Mattox, 156 U.S. at 238.
' Id. at 244. Although the precise question had never before arisen in the Supreme
Court, the concept embodied by the court's ruling was not new. The rule, already existing
in more than a dozen states, was summarized by the court. "[T'he tight of cross-
examination having once been exercised, it [is] no hardship upon the defendant to allow
the testimony of the deceased witness to be read .... The substance of the constitutional
protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of seeing the
witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of a cross-examination." Id. at
242, 244. Defending its ruling, the Court cited, by way of example, dying declarations
which are admitted because of the necessities of the case and to prevent what would
otherwise be a manifest failure of justice. Id. at 244. The requisite reliability is found in
the belief that a sense of impending death would remove all temptation to lie. Id.
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examination, and the trier of fact possesses the opportunity to
judge from witness' demeanor whether the testimony is worthy
of belief.59 Confrontation at an earlier time or in a different
forum can only serve the first two of these purposes; the oppor-
tunity for the factfinder to observe the witness' demeanor is lost.
Thus, confrontation that occurred in an earlier and different
forum is not identical to confrontation in the current forum
because one of its components, the opportunity to judge de-
meanor, is missing. Mattox left uncertain whether that last com-
ponent was, in that particular context, unnecessary, or whether it
was for some entirely different reason that the hearsay in that
case satisfied the confrontation clause. One thing was certain,
though: the hearsay in Mattox had been cross-examined.
A second interpretation of Mattox is that the confrontation
clause does not require the precise components of actual confron-
tation, only their equivalent. By this reasoning, the evidence in
Mattox would have been admissible not because the components
of confrontation had occurred previously. Rather, the statement
would have been admissible because reliability, the pre-eminent
requirement, was coincidentally satisfied by the prior confronta-
tion. By this rationale, constitutional anxiety over the admission
of hearsay from a non-testifying declarant would be assuaged as
long as the hearsay evidence were as reliable as if trial confron-
tation had occurred.
Because the evidence in Mattox had been subjected to a
process looking very much like traditional confrontation, the
possibility that the test was a generic one of reliability, rather
than a specific one of confrontation, did not appear at the time
likely. Moreover, because death is an undisputed form of unavail-
ability, the Mattox Court did not address whether presumed
reliability might satisfy the admissibility threshold of the confron-
tation clause in all cases or only when the declarant, as in Mattox
itself, is unavailable to testify in person.
The next significant case did not come before the Court until
Pointer v. Texas6° in 1965. Best known for holding the confron-
19 See id. at 242.
- 380 U.S. 400 (1965). In the intervening years, Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S.
586 (1924), had been decided. In Delaney, the defendant, joined for trial with a defendant
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tation clause applicable to the states, 61 Pointer involved the pro-
secution's introduction of the preliminary hearing transcript of a
witness who had since left the jurisdiction and who, accordingly,
did not appear at the defendant's trial. The Court noted first that
the defendant had not been represented by an attorney at the
preliminary hearing.62 As a result, there had been no cross-ex-
amination.63 Accordingly, the statements in the preliminary hear-
ing transcript were found not to have been taken under
circumstances affording an adequate opportunity for cross-ex-
amination. Despite reaffirming the admissibility of dying decla-
rations, the Pointer Court concluded that introduction of the
statements in the case before it violated the confrontation clause.
64
Pointer was both like and unlike Mattox. Like Mattox, the
witness in Pointer was unavailable. Like Mattox, the hearsay in
Pointer consisted of prior testimony. Unlike Mattox, the hearsay
had not been cross-examined. And unlike Mattox, the prior tes-
timony in Pointer occurred at a preliminary hearing, not a trial.
Why, then, was the hearsay in Pointer constitutionally unaccept-
able? Both cases involved statements made under oath, making
that an impossible basis of distinction. Mattox had already elim-
inated the possibility that demeanor was critical. Left as the only
possible area of constitutional distinction, then, was the lack of
cross-examination in Pointer.
In the same way that the Mattox Court had been reticent
about its reasoning, the Pointer Court never explained why the
from a separate, but related, indictment, protested on confrontation grounds the admission
into evidence of yet another alleged co-conspirator's out-of-court statement. The co-
conspiratorial declarant did not testify because he was dead. Ruling that the testimony fit
within prior case law, the Court held its admission proper. Two items are worthy of
mention. First, the court spent not one word on why the co-conspirator's statement was
reliable enough to comport with confrontation clause guarantees. Secondly, whatever the
Court's belief regarding reliability, factually the issue was circumscribed by the necessity
caused by the declarant's death. This, then for whatever else it means, represents a case
where production of the declarant was not an option.
61 Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403. At this time a debate raged regarding the extension of
the Bill of Rights' guarantee to the States. See id. at 411 & n.1 (Goldberg, J., concurring)
for a list and discussion of cases involving the incorporation debate.
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 402.
63 At the preliminary hearing, Pointer's co-defendant, also without benefit of counsel,
attempted to cross-examine the particular witness, but Pointer did not. Id. at 401.
Id. at 407.
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lack of cross-examination rendered the Pointer hearsay inadmis-
sible. Again, the potential explanations Were several. One expla-
nation was that in Pointer the Court considered cross-examination
alone constitutionally required. This would have explained both
Mattox and Pointer. Another explanation was that the confron-
tation clause requires some form of confrontation and that cross-
exdamination is that part of prior confrontation necessary to sub-
stitute prior confrontation for current confrontation. This, too,
would have explained Mattox and Pointer. A third explanation
was that the confrontation clause requires only a showing of
likely reliability, and that cross-examination is a suitable, but by
no means exclusive, indicium of reliability. That, too, would have
explained both cases. Although these questions were not specifi-
cally answered by the Pointer Court, the opinion did suggest an
answer.
By reaffirming in dicta the constitutional legitimacy of dying
declarations, Pointer disspelled the implication in Mattox that the
confrontation clause can be satisfied only by confrontation, even
if the confrontation occurred at some earlier time.65 Acknowl-
edgement of dying declarations implied that, at least in some
circumstances, hearsay not subject to any form of prior confron-
tation was nevertheless constitutionally acceptable. This strength-
ened the possibility that the missing cross-examination in Pointer
was important as a fungible gauge of reliability, not as a sine qua
non of confrontation. If this were true, however, Pointer did not
specify how, other than by cross-examination or dying declara-
tions, constitutional reliability was to be evaluated. Most impor-
tantly, since thus far the hearsay declarants had been unavailable,
Pointer did not address whether the availability of the declarant
would change its willingness to allow introduction of hearsay only
presumed reliable. If all three benefits of confrontation could be
achieved, would sacrifice of any ever be justified?
On the same day that Pointer was announced, the Supreme
Court decided Douglas v. Alabama.6 Under the guise of cross-
examination to refresh recollection, the prosecution at Douglas'
61 Dying declarations are believed to be the only exception to the hearsay rule existing
at the time of the adoption of the confrontation clause. See supra note 26.
380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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trial had effectively read into the record a confession allegedly
made by Douglas' previously-convicted accomplice. The accom-
plice, whose case was on appeal, refused to testify when called
upon to do so.
Douglas presented similarities and dissimilarities to the prior
cases. Factually, Douglas, like Mattox and Pointer, involved hear-
say evidence of an unavailable declarant. 67 As in Pointer, the
statement had not been previously cross-examined, nor could it
be currently cross-examined. Unlike both Mattox and Pointer,
however, Douglas did not involve prior testimony.
If the Pointer Court's reaffirmation of the admissibility of
dying declarations had established cross-examination as a suitable
but by no means exclusive guage of reliability, then one would
have expected the Douglas Court to have discussed suitable stan-
dards and to have evaluated the hearsay in that case by those
standards. Instead, however, in reversing Douglas' conviction, the
Court stated unequivocally that Douglas' inability to cross-ex-
amine his co-defendant as to the latter's alleged confession denied
Douglas the right of cross-examination "secured by the Confron-
tation Clause.' '68
Because of, or perhaps in spite of, the abrupt manner in
which it linked a defendant's right of cross-examination to the
confrontation clause, the Douglas Court did not fully clarify the
basis of its decision. It did not specify whether, as Pointer had
suggested, the lack of prior cross-examination rendered Douglas'
Despite his presence at trial, the co-defendant's reliance on his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination constitutes legal unavailability. Id.; see, e.g., FED. R.
Evm. 804(a)(1), supra note 30.
-Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419. That co-defendant confessions tend to be unreliable is
well-noted. Lee, 476 U.S. at 539; Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136 (1968). In addition, the effort
by the prosecutor to "refresh" the accomplice's recollection by reading the confession
bordered on prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 187 n.20 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Notes of Advisory Committee 6in Proposed Rules of Evidence; cf. Natali,
Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 Rur.-CAm. L.J. 43,
49 n.39 (1975) (nothing in the Court's opinion or in Justice Harlan's concurrence supports
a conclusion that Douglas involved prosecutorial misconduct). In fact, a clue to this
possibility does appear in the Court's opinion. Although the prosecutor in Douglas read
from the document, and three law enforcement officers identified it as having been signed
by the accomplice, the prosecutor never offered the document into evidence. Douglas, 380
U.S. at 417. In addition, the Court later characterized the prosecutor's actions as a "guise."
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127.
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accomplice's hearsay inadmissible or whether the lack of oppor-
tunity for current cross-examination was the troublesome aspect
of the case. In both Mattox and Pointer, the hearsay sought to
be admitted was prior testimony. In that context, whether because
a sine qua non or a fungible gauge of reliability, cross-examination
appeared to be the constitutional difference between admissible
and inadmissible hearsay. By elevating a defendant's right of
cross-examination to a matter of constitutional significance,
Douglas was consistent with the prior cases, but the Court did
not explain the relation, if any, between the requirement of cross-
examination and the jurisprudential basis for admitting dying
declarations.
Ultimately, the deficiency in Douglas was not the absence of
previous cross-examination, but the lack of opportunity for pres-
ent cross-examination. Viewed with this distinction in mind, the
role of cross-examination as a constitutionally required component
of trial confrontation is broader and more probative than-and
accordingly constitutionally distinct from-cross-examination that
happens to have occurred at some earlier time in some other
place. Admittedly, cross-examination is constitutionally required
where the question is whether an unavailable declarant's prior
testimony is admissible. To say that cross-examination is consti-
tutionally required in order for prior testimony to be admissible
is not to say, however, either that a defendant has a constitutional
right of cross-examination in all cases or that cross-examination
will render admissible any earlier statement. Nor does the fact
that cross-examination renders prior testimony admissible where
the declarant is unavailable suggest prior cross-examination should
suffice where the declarant is testifying (produced) or available
but not called (available). At the time, however, Douglas discussed
none of these subtleties. By broadly linking an opportunity to
cross-examine with the confrontation clause, implying that the
latter is satisfied anytime the former has occurred, the Court with
one quick stroke painted itself into a comer of inflexibility.
The focus changed slightly in 1968 with Barber v. Page.69 At
the trial, the prosecution introduced the preliminary hearing tran-
- 390 U.S. 719 (1968). In the intervening years, the Court had decided Brookhart,
384 U.S. 1. Because, without the consent of the client, the defendant's attorney had agreed
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script of an uncross-examined witness absent because he was
incarcerated in a federal prison in a nearby state.
As the whereabouts of the declarant were known, Barber was
the first case that might have required that available witnesses be
produced. This never happened, however. In its opinion, the
Barber Court acknowledged the recognized exception to trial con-
frontation where the declarant is unavailable but at a previous
judicial proceeding had given testimony subject to cross-exami-
nation by the defendant against whom the testimony is now being
offered.70 The Court, however, described this exception as "aris-
ing from necessity" 71 and concluded that where the prosecution
has not demonstrated a good faith effort to secure the attendance
of the witness, an exception to the right of confrontation is not
justified.72 On this basis, the Court found that admission of the
transcript violated the defendant's confrontation rights. Moreo-
ver, defining confrontation as basically a trial right, including
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the
trier of fact to weigh the demeanor of the witness, the Court
concluded that it would have reached the same result even if the
witness had been cross-examined. 73
to a form of proceeding which, instead of a full trial, resulted in the defendant's offering
no evidence and foregoing the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses,
the Court, primarily on the issue of waiver, found a violation of the defendant's confron-
tation clause right of cross-examination. Id. at 5. The Court further observed that without
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine
the prosecution's witnesses, the defendant's confrontation clause rights would also be
violated by the introduction of an alleged confession of a co-defendant "who did not
testify in court, [where] petitioner was therefore denied any opportunity whatever to
confront and cross-examine the witness who made the very damaging statement." Id. at
4. Because of the very unusual nature of the proceedings and the Court's reliance on
waiver as a basis for its decision, little consideration was given to the reference regarding
the failure of the co-defendant to testify nor to whether his availability or lack thereof
would have affected the outcome.
70 Barber, 390 U.S. at 722.
71 Id.
7 See id. at 724-25. In fact, the absent witness had not been cross-examined by
Barber's attorney at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 720. The Court, however, found this
insignificant. See id. at 725. In Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1966), Barber was
given retroactive application despite cross-examination of the witness at the preliminary
hearing, giving further support to the idea that even the existence of prior cross-examination
could not overcome a rule of necessity. Admittedly, the case involved former testimony,
which traditionally was admissible only where the declarant was unavailable, but the Barber
Court never used this as a ground of reliance. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
71 Barber, 390 U.S. at 725. In reality, Barber's attorney could not have cross-
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The clear message of Barber is that where the declarant is
available, the benefits of trial confrontation so outweigh the
substitute benefits of even previously cross-examined testimony,
the Constitution requires the former. Instead of transforming that
recognition into a rule requiring that available witnesses be pro-
duced, the Court in Barber spoke from the opposite perspective:
since trial confrontation is preferable, the declarant must be una-
vailable in order for prior testimony to be admitted.74 Framing
the requirement as one excluding evidence if the witness is pro-
duced rather than as one requiring production of available wit-
nesses makes no difference where evidentiary rules, or, as the
Court held in Barber, constitutional dictates, require unavailabil-
ity. The hearsay will not be admitted irrespective of whether the
declarant is produced or is available but not produced. Where,
however, evidentiary rules do not require that the declarant be
unavailable, 75 the Constitution must impose such a requirement;
otherwise, the failure of the Barber Court to speak in the affir-
mative would mean that the hearsay statement of our hypothetical
magazine reader is admissible despite his availability. This is
because where the evidentiary rules do not require unavailability,
the confrontation clause preference for face-to-face confrontation
provides the only motivation for "available" witnesses to become
"produced" witnesses. Thus, although the difference in the two
phrases meant nothing in the context of an unavailable witness,
it would have great impact when later the Court would consider
the admissibility of hearsay from an available declarant.
Later that same year, the court decided Bruton v. United
States.7 6 Bruton, a case of some continuing renown, involved the
admission in their joint trial of Bruton's co-defendant's pre-trial
examined the witness at the preliminary hearing because he had represented the witness at
the same time and on the same matter as he had represented Barber. To have cross-
examined a former client about a matter that had been the subject of representation is an
obvious conflict of interest. See MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmi-rrY, DR 5-10
(1980).
7 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25.
7' There are 24 exceptions in FED. R. Evm. 803, none requiring unavailability of the
declarant. There are eight exclusions from the definition of hearsay in FED. R. Evm. 801,
none requiring unavailability of the declarant. Together these constitute the majority of
exceptions to the hearsay rule. In contrast, FED. R. Evim. 804, requiring the declarant's
unavailability, contains only five exceptions. See also supra notes 30, 31 and 36.
76 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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confession. That confession implicated Bruton, but he did not
have an opportunity to test it through cross-examination because
his co-defendant did not testify.
77
Though Bruton and Douglas appear distinguishable, the two
cases are quite similar.78 Each involved the introduction of un-
cross-examined hearsay from an unavailable declarant. 79 Each
presented the Court with the necessity of admitting the evidence
or doing without it. And in each the Court held constitutionally
impermissible the introduction of an out-of-court statement not
previously cross-examined, not then able to be cross-examined,
and not bearing other (unspecified) indicia of reliability, even
though the declarant was unavailable.80 The only difference be-
tween the cases is that by the time of Bruton, the link between
the confrontation clause and the opportunity for cross-examina-
tion was no longer in question: "Despite the concededly clear
instructions to the jury to disregard [the co-defendant's] inadmis-
sible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context of a
joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate
substitute for petitioner's constitutional right of cross-examina-
tion."8 ' Thus, by 1968, the Court had apparently concluded that
" The trial court specifically instructed the jury that it should consider the confession
against Bruton's co-defendant only. For the relevant portion of the Court's instructions,
see Bruton, 391 U.S. at 125 n.2. In overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957), the Bruton Court held that because of the powerful impact of the confession, even
the trial court's limiting instructions were insufficient to protect Bruton's confrontation
rights. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. Bruton was given retroactive effect in Roberts v. Russell,
392 U.S. 293 (1968).
" In Douglas the prosecutor sought to use the accomplice's confession against
Douglas in his individual trial. Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416-17. Although it was a joint trial,
the prosecutor in Bruton, on the other hand, mindful of Douglas, sought to use the co-
defendant's confession solely against the confessor. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.
7' Just as was the case in Douglas, the declarant in Bruton, though physically present,
was legally unavailable by virtue of his privilege not to incriminate himself. See supra note
67.
Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420; Bruton, 391 U.S, at 137.
, Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136-37. Of course, a fundamental tenet of this country's
jurisprudence is that defendants cannot be forced to incriminate themselves. See infra note
123. At trial, this has the practical effect of preventing any party from forcing a defendant
to appear as a witness. Accordingly, the potential for Bruton to force his co-defendant to
testify was nil. Following Bruton, prosecutors who sought joint trials were able to admit
the confession of one co-defendant by employing a procedure called redaction, by which
references to non-confessing co-defendants are purged from the confession. See generally
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10. Over the years, this evolved into a rule that the interlocking
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the confrontation clause imposed a constitutional right of cross-
examination and a requirement, at least for prior testimony, that
in order for hearsay to be admissible, a non-testifying declarant
must be unavailable.
B. The Search for the Relationship Between Unavailability and
Required Reliability
The importance of declarant unavailability surfaced again in
California v. Green,82 decided in 1970. Green involved a Califor-
nia statute that permitted the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements . 3 Relying on the statute, the prosecutor in Green
sought to introduce both the cross-examined preliminary hearing
testimony and the uncross-examined oral pre-trial statements of
sixteen-year-old Melvin Porter, a witness in Green's trial for
distribution of narcotics. Porter was not unavailable in the tra-
ditional sense. Quite the contrary, he appeared as a prosecution
witness in Green's trial. Resort to Porter's out-of-court statements
was needed because he claimed during the trial that the use of a
mind-altering drug (LSD) shortly before the events in question
prevented him from remembering those events at trial, rendering
him immune to effective direct or cross-examination at trial.
Porter did admit, however, that he believed his earlier oral state-
ment and preliminary hearing testimony were probably true, de-
spite his present inability to verify the truth of those statements.s
4
In what was then a landmark decision, the Green Court
answered questions left open by its earlier opinions. The Court
nature of a defendant's confession may bear on the reliability of a co-defendant's statement,
making the latter admissible upon a showing of unavailability or, alternatively, making
introduction a harmless error. Cruz v. New York, .U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1714, 1717-
18 (1987). See generally Richardson v. Marsh, -.._U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1708
(1987).
- 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
10 California's Evidence Code provided that "[e]vidence of a statement made by a
witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with
his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770." CAIF. Evm.
CODE § 1235 (1966) (effective Jan. 1, 1967), quoted in Green, 399 U.S. at 150. Section
770 required that the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement
at some point in the trial. CALF. Evin. CODE § 770 (1966) (effective Jan. 1, 1967), quoted
in Green, 399 U.S. at 150 n.I.
- Green, 399 U.S. at 152.
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ruled first that the confrontation clause is not violated by the
introduction of a declarant's out-of-court statements as long as
the declarant is produced as a witness and thereby subject to full
and effective cross-examination.8 5 In terms of the pending facts,
this meant that Porter's presence at Green's trial with the accom-
panying opportunity for cross-examination satisfied the constitu-
tional requirement of confrontation, even as to prior statements
not cross-examined when made. Thus, the Green Court said, had
the witnesses in Douglas and Bruton been able to be cross-
examined, there would have been no constitutional bar to the
admission of the out-of-court statements.86 In terms of jurispru-
dence, this meant that if the witness was produced and was able
to be cross-examined, for confrontation clause purposes, any prior
out-of-court statement could be admitted. 87
Secondly, the Court held that even if Porter's professed lack
of memory rendered him immune to cross-examination, and hence
legally unavailable, his preliminary hearing statements would be
admissible because the preliminary hearing had been conducted
under circumstances very similar to those of a trial.88 According
to the Green Court, because the right of cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing provides substantial compliance with the pur-
poses behind the confrontation clause requirement, it was suffi-
cient to satisfy the confrontation clause. The only issue left open,
to be settled on remand, was whether Porter's lack of memory
rendered him sufficiently unavailable for present cross-examina-
tion, such that the reliability of the uncross-examined oral state-
ments could not be presently tested.89 If no present opportunity
" Id. at 158.
16 Id. at 163.
17 The constitutional implications of Green are to be distinguished from the tradi-
tional evidentiary rules that include in the definition of hearsay the out-of-court statements
of the testifying witness. Because these statements are defined as hearsay, they will be
inadmissible for evidentiary purposes unless they qualify as an exception. This is true
despite the fact that the statements might be constitutionally admissible.
u Years earlier, the Court had held that where the declarant was unavailable,
recorded testimony from an earlier trial was admissible. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244. For the
Green Court, the similarities between a preliminary hearing and a trial, including testimony
under oath, representation by counsel, and cross-examination, sufficed to bring the case
within the Mattox rule. Green, 399 U.S. at 165 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. 237).
" Green, 399 U.S. at 168-70. The result made sense, since Douglas, Pointer, and
Bruton had already established that even if the witness is unavailable, the confrontation
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for cross-examination existed, the uncross-examined oral state-
ments would be an affront to the confrontation clause because
they would be unreliable.9
clause imposes a requirement of reliability that arguably Porter's uncross-examined oral
statement did not possess. On remand, the California Supreme Court held that since the
witness had been cross-examined at trial, and, accordingly, was required to take a position
regarding the truthfulness of his statements, adequate confrontation had occurred. People
v. Green, 479 P.2d 998, 1003-1004, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499-500 (1971). In United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988), the Supreme Court addressed the issue it
had remanded in Green, namely whether a testifying witness' memory loss might so restrict
cross-examination as to render introduction of that witness' out-of-court statement a
violation of the confrontation clause. Owens was charged with assault with intent to
commit murder in connection with an assault on a correctional officer at the federal prison
where Owens was incarcerated. Although as a result of the attack his memory was severely
impaired, the victim was permitted to testify at trial that while hospitalized he had identified
Owens as his attacker to an F.B.I. agent, despite the victim's admission at trial that he
could no longer remember seeing his attacker. Id. at 841. Citing the California Supreme
Court's decision in People v. Green, and relying on Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15
(1985) (per curiam), the Court concluded that when a hearsay declarant is present and
subject to unrestricted cross-examination, introduction of an earlier out-of-court statement
does not offend the confrontation clause. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843. Superficially, Owens
appears consonant with the California Supreme Court's decision in Green and with the
thesis of this article: trial cross-examination of a produced witness satisfies the confrontation
clause. Owens differs from Green, however, because although the declarant in Green had
a memory loss regarding the underlying events, that memory loss did not extend to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement. Green, 399 U.S. at
152. Thus, while Porter, the declarant in Green, could not be challenged regarding the
underlying events, he could be challenged regarding the making of the statement. The
memory loss suffered by the victim in Owens, on the other hand, prevented him from
being questioned about the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, in-
cluding whether or not any visitors to the hospital had suggested that Owens was the
attacker. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Interestingly, an argument
can be made that an inability to be cross-examined might render the victim in Owens
legally unavailable. FED. R. Evm. 804(a)(3); see supra note 30. Constitutionally, though,
admission of the out-of-court statement because of the unavailability of the declarant
would then require a demonstration of the statement's reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 65 (1980). The general recognition that hearsay exclusions do not derive from
guarantees of reliability, see supra text accompanying note 38, confirmed by the requirement
of FED. R. Evn). 801(d)(1)(C) that excludes prior identifications from the category of
hearsay only if the declarant testifies as a witness, see supra note 36, suggest that the out-
of-court statement of the victim in Owens would meet neither constitutional nor evidentiary
requirements of reliability. As decided, however, Owens represents yet one more step by
the Court in the direction of admitting hearsay while simultaneously restricting a defen-
dant's ability to challenge its reliability.
90 That this was the thinking of the Court is borne out by its acknowledgement that
since its holding approved the admission of Porter's preliminary hearing statements,
admission of his oral statements, if unable to be cross-examined at trial, might constitute
harmless error. Green, 399 U.S. at 170.
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Regarding the issue of availability, the facts in Green did not
present, and the Court did not address, the question of whether
the constitutional analysis would differ if Porter had been avail-
able but simply not produced. Regarding the constitutional role
of cross-examination, Green, like Pointer, implied that the cross-
examination of prior testimony rendered that testimony admissi-
ble. Also like Pointer, Green did not specify whether cross-ex-
amination was a dividing line applicable only to cases involving
prior testimony or whether the existence of cross-examination
simply rendered prior testimony constitutionally reliable in one of
several fungible ways. More importantly, what remained hidden
below the surface, and hence overlooked, was the elusive question
still not presented factually by any Supreme Court case: Does the
confrontation clause impose an obligation to produce an available
declarant in the situation where the out-of-court evidence was not
cross-examined but seems otherwise reliable?
The question appeared to be raised by the next significant
confrontation clause case to reach the Court. Dutton v. Evans91
involved the admission of a statement made during the conceal-
ment phase of a conspiracy by a non-testifying but arguably
available co-conspirator. 92 In answering the framed question-
must the conviction be set aside because of the admission of the
co-conspirator's testimony-a plurality of the Court concluded
that the conviction could stand despite the confrontation clause
challenge.9 3 Admittedly, one could read Evans as sanctioning the
11 400 U.S. 74 (1970). For an excellent analysis of the Evans opinion, see The
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAQv. L. R-v. 3, 188-99 (1971).
9The Georgia statute provided that "[a]fter the fact of conspiracy shall be proved,
the declarations by any one of the co-conspirators during the pendency of the criminal
project shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954). The co-conspir-
ator's statement in Evans should be distinguished from a co-defendant's confession, made
after arrest, which was at issue in Douglas and Bruton.
91 As posed, the question begs a harmless error analysis. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan provided the fifth and decisive vote on the merits of the case. Justice
Harlan's concurrence is particularly noteworthy because in it he repudiates the position he
adopted in his concurrence in Green. Evans, 400 U.S. at 94 (Harlan, J., concurring). In
Green, Justice Harlan had argued that the primary reach of the confrontation clause was
to require the prosecution to produce any available witness whose out-of-court declarations
the prosecution wants to introduce. Green, 399 U.S. at 174. In Evans, Justice Harlan
announced a preference for a fifth and fourteenth amendment due process approach.
Evans, 400 U.S. at 96-97. His explanation for the shift in thinking hearkens back to
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admission of hearsay where the hearsay, though not previously
nor then cross-examined, was believed reliable 4 In actuality,
however, Justice Powell's plurality opinion reads much more like
a harmless error analysis than an analysis finding no error in the
first place.95 Moreover, although the case implicitly raised the
question of witness availability,9 the defendant never complained
of the prosecution's failure to produce the declarant. Rather,
Evans' complaint went solely to the breadth of the Georgia stat-
ute.Y Evans did not challenge, and accordingly the Court did not
question, the validity of the co-conspirator exception applied in
the federal courts. 98 The Court ruled, "We cannot say that the
evidentiary rule applied by Georgia violates the Constitution merely
because it does not exactly coincide with the hearsay exception
applicable in ... a federal prosecution .... 9" This ruling nei-
Wigmore. See infra note 150. Essentially, Justice Harlan became convinced that the
confrontation clause was not initially designed to address the use of hearsay and that it is
particularly unsuited to the task. Evans, 400 U.S. at 94-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In defending his opinion, Justice Powell provided four reasons why admission of
the co-conspirator's statement does not offend the confrontation clause: first, the statement
contained no express assertion of fact and hence broadcast its doubtful validity; second,
the establishment of the declarant's personal knowledge by abundant evidence precluded
the ability of cross-examination to establish the contrary; third, the possibility that the
statement was the product of the declarant's faulty memory was extremely remote; and
fourth, the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement made it unlikely the
declarant misrepresented the defendant's involvement. Evans, 400 U.S. at 88-89. The
reasons read like a conclusion that the statement was reliable, but nowhere did the Court
state that that was the ground of admissibility.
" Specifically, Justice Powell placed emphasis on the fact that the evidence was
neither crucial nor devastating, as had been the case in Pointer, Douglas, Brookhart, and
Barber. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87. See also Natali, supra note 68, at 50-51 (Evans was really
a case of harmless error). Harmless error is what its name implies. It combines an
acknowledgement that error has occurred with a conclusion that the error is not sufficiently
grave to warrant reversal. See generally Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-26 (1967).
In Chapman, the Court ruled for the first time that in addition to evidentiary errors,
errors of constitutional magnitude could be harmless. Id. at 22.
9The Court apparently concluded that the co-defendant theoretically was available.
Evans, 400 U.S. at 88 n.19.
11 The sole thrust of Evan's argument was that the Georgia hearsay exception was
constitutionally invalid because it was broader than the hearsay exception applicable to
conspiracy trials in federal courts. Evans, 400 U.S. at 80.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 83. Nor is it clear that the statement at issue, "If it hadn't been for that
dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans- [the defendant], we wouldn't be in this now," id. at 77,
is truly an assertion at all, since it is only through implication that the defendant is
inculpated. This was the plurality's first reason for finding that admission of the statement
did not offend the confrontation clause. See supra note 94.
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ther addressed nor decided whether, had the evidence not been as
peripheral as Justice Powell found it to be,100 the defendant's
confrontation clause rights would have yielded to the admission
of the evidence as well as required production of the declarant
for cross-examination.
Thus, the elusive question of whether the confrontation clause
required the production of available witnesses was still not clearly
answered. Ironically, although the precise question was not raised
by the Court's next case, Ohio v. Roberts,101 the answer was
provided in the Court's opinion.
Roberts involved the prosecution's effort to introduce, as
rebuttal evidence, the transcript of a witness who had testified at
Roberts' preliminary hearing but who had failed to respond to
subpoenas to appear at the accused's trial. Specifically, at Rob-
erts' preliminary hearing on charges of forging a check and pos-
session of stolen credit cards, his attorney called as the defense's
only witness the daughter of the alleged owner of the check and
credit cards. On direct examination, the daughter testified that
she knew Roberts and had let him use her apartment for several
days while she was away. Despite repeated questioning, however,
she denied that she had given him her parents' checks and credit
cards without telling him that she had no permission to use them.
Roberts' attorney, who had called the daughter on direct, did not
request that she be declared hostile, nor did he ask to examine
her as if on cross-examination. The prosecutor asked her no
questions. 102
Evans, 400 U.S. at 87.
J01 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In the years between Evans and Roberts the Court decided
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). Stubbs raised the issue of second-offender
sentencing where the predicate offense was alleged to have been obtained in violation of
the defendant's confrontation rights. Specifically, the defendant complained that the read-,
ing of a transcript of a witness' testimony from a former trial was improper because the
Barber requirement of unavailability had not been met. Id.; see Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-
25 and supra text accompanying notes 69-72. Finding no constitutional error in the reading
of the transcript, the Stubbs Court reaffirmed Barber's constitutional requirement of
unavailability prior to the admission of former testimony, Stubbs, 408 U.S. at 216;
reaffirmed the Evans requirement that even though a witness may be unavailable, the
confrontation clause requires a showing that the out-of-court statement be reliable, id. at
213; and reaffirmed the Green holding that prior constitutionally adequate cross-exami-
nation establishes the requisite test of reliability, id. at 216.
,0 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.
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Between the time of Roberts' preliminary hearing and his
trial, the prosecution issued five subpoenas to the daughter, none
of which was personally served or prompted her appearance. At
the trial, after hearing testimony from the mother that the daugh-
ter's whereabouts were unknown, the Court admitted the daugh-
ter's transcript, having concluded that, despite some "leads,"
sufficient evidence was shown to establish that the daughter was
in fact unavailable. 103
The Supreme Court perceived the controversy as once again
requiring consideration of the relationship between the confron-
tation clause and the hearsay exceptions.° 4 Reminding readers of
what it considered a settled issue, the Court stressed that the
confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face con-
frontation at trial.Ios It also re-emphasized that a primary interest
secured by the clause is the right of cross-examination but ac-
knowledged that in some instances necessity may require that
confrontation at trial be dispensed with.10 Nevertheless, the Rob-
erts Court concluded that its proper response was not to provide
a sweeping answer to the dilemma but rather to proceed in a
case-by-case fashion. In so doing, however, the Court did detail
what it perceived to be some emerging guidelines.
In the view of the Roberts Court, the confrontation clause
places two restrictions on the admission of hearsay.
First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-
face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of
necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-
examination has occurred), the prosecutor must either produce,
103 Id. at 77.
104 Id. at 62.
410 Id. at 63.
101 Id. at 63, 64. By way of example, the Court referred to the holding in Mattox v.
United States that prior cross-examined testimony may be admissible when the necessities
of the case so require. See Mattox, 156 U.S. 237; see also supra notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text. The court then referred to Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934),
which involved that aspect of the confrontation clause pertaining to the presence of the
defendant at his trial. Finally, the Court referred to Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 171, where the Chief Justice emphasized that
innovation and experimentation by the states in formulating criminal justice rules, so long
as consistent with the Constitution, should be encouraged. Obviously, none of the Court's
references involve the sanctioning of the use of hearsay when the declarant is available but
not produced.
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or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose state-
ment it wishes to use against the defendant.1 7
The second restriction, operable only after a witness is shown to
be unavailable, is intended to augment accuracy by "ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence .... "-0 In
this latter situation, when witness unavailability leaves no alter-
native but the use of hearsay, the confrontation clause will coun-
tenance hearsay only of such trustworthiness as to accord with
the reason of the general rule.' °9
If the Court had stopped there, some clarity might have
evolved regarding the elusive relationship between the confronta-
tion clause and the use of hearsay; Unfortunately, however, the
Court had to resolve the particular controversy before it, and in
so doing made the following observation: "In sum, when a hear-
say declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
confrontation clause normally requires a showing that he is una-
vailable." 110 Even if the Court believed it to be of no substantive
difference, this subtle change, from an affirmative requirement
that the witness be produced or be unavailable to a contingent
requirement that if not present the person must be unavailable,
was significant. '
There are three "places" a hearsay declarant can be when the
prosecution seeks to introduce that person's out-of-court state-
ment. The declarant can be on the stand subject to cross-exami-
nation (produced), dead (unavailable) or reading a magazine in
the courthouse lobby (available but not produced). A rule affir-
matively requiring the prosecution to produce or demonstrate the
unavailability of a witness whose hearsay statement it wishes to
introduce not only acknowledges all three "places" but also forces
the prosecution, where that witness is not produced but is none-
theless available, to produce that person. A rule that requires a
non-testifying witness to be unavailable implies that there are only
two places that a witness could be: testifying (produced) or una-
107Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
108 Id.
,09 Id.
11 Id. at 66.
" This is the same type of word change the Court had employed earlier in Barber.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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vailable, by thus implying that a person would only be non-
testifying because unavailable. This overlooks the possibility that
the person is non-testifying because no one asked the person,
though available, to appear. Accordingly, the Court's statement
that when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the confrontation clause normally requires a showing that
the witness is unavailable, the statement differed from its earlier
version by omitting the possibility that the witness could be pro-
duced, a possibility that is significant where unavailability is not
required.
The reason for the Roberts court's subtle word change, how-
ever, is easily understood. Independent of the constitutional issue,
Roberts, like Green and Barber, and even Mattox, involved evi-
dentiary hearsay exceptions to the hearsay rule traditionally ap-
plicable only when the declarant was unavailable. For example,
Mattox involved prior trial testimony and whether it can be
admitted where the declarant had since died. Barber, too, involved
prior testimony and the level of showing necessary to establish
legal unavailability. Green concerned whether loss of memory
established requisite legal unavailability, as well as whether present
cross-examination can substitute for a lost opportunity for earlier
cross-examination, where prior formal testimony is involved. Rob-
erts, like Barber, took this evidentiary predicate and analyzed it
in constitutional terms. Accordingly, Roberts' conception of una-
vailability occurred in a situation where production of the declar-
ant would never arise because both the evidentiary and
constitutional rules require unavailability.
1
1
2
Thus, from Mattox to Roberts the Court forged some general
principles regarding the relationship between hearsay and the
confrontation clause, but primarily in situations where production
112 Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25; see also supra note 30 and FaR. R. EviD. 804(b)(1),
which excludes the following from the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest,
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. Evim. 804(b)(1).
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either was not factually possible or was prohibited by governing
evidentiary requirements. By the end of these cases it was clear,
for instance, that where the declarant is unavailable, the confron-
tation clause is not offended by the use of certain hearsay."3 We
knew that where hearsay is admitted in the absence of the de-
clarant, the confrontation clause requires that it possess some
indicia of reliability. Cross-examination, although not the only
test of reliability," 4 is by far the indicia of choice."- It was clear
that where a statement not subject to cross-examination bears no
other indicia of reliability, it is inadmissible unless the declarant
is produced at trial for present cross-examination." 6 We knew
that where the witness is produced at trial, the opportunity for
cross-examination at trial regarding a statement previously made
is a sufficient test of that statement's reliability to allow it to be
admitted."7 And we suspected that trial confrontation is prefera-
ble to hearsay denoted reliable because of the circumstances sur-
rounding its making."
8
What we did not know for certain after Roberts was whether
in a situation where evidentiary rules do not require unavailability,
the Constitution barred the admission of hearsay from a declarant
who was not unavailable but was merely not produced. The
question did not come up in Mattox because the declarant was
dead. It did not arise in Pointer because again the declarant was
unavailable. Douglas did not address the question because in that
case the declarant, although produced, was unavailable. Bruton
did not raise the question because, again, the declarant was una-
vailable. Green did not require an answer because Porter was
either produced, subject to cross-examination at trial, or unavail-
able if (despite his appearance) he could not be cross-examined.
,,3 Mattox, 156 U.S. 237, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text; Pointer, 380
U.S. 400, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text; Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), see
supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text; Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), see supra notes
101-10 and accompanying text.
"4 See, e.g., Mattox, 146 U.S. 140 (dying declarations).
'" See supra note 113; Douglas, 380 U.S. 415, see supra notes 66-68 and accompa-
nying text; Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 115; see also Green, 399 U.S. 149 and supra notes 82-90 and
accompanying text.
", Green, 399 U.S. 149, see supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
", Barber, 390 U.S. 719, see supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text; Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, see supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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And Roberts did not ask the question because, yet again, the
declarant was unavailable.
Six years after Roberts, the question whether an available
hearsay declarant must be produced was finally answered in United
States v. Inadi.119 A year later the Court addressed what satisfies
the confrontation clause's requirement of reliability in cases where
there is no cross-examination.'12 By this time, however, the pron-
ouncements of the earlier cases had predetermined the answers.
C. The Court's Solution
United States v. Inadi2' involved a situation where the appli-
cable exception to the hearsay rule did not condition admissibility
on the unavailability of the declarant. i 2 The case thus provided
the opportunity for the Court to consider whether, when the
declarant is available but coincidentally is not produced, the con-
frontation clause tempers the otherwise unrestrictive approach of
the evidentiary rules by requiring that available declarants be
produced.
Inadi was tried for several narcotics violations, including con-
spiracy to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. At his
trial, the government sought to introduce tape recorded conver-
sations of four other members of the conspiracy. Two of the four
co-conspirators appeared and testified at Inadi's trial. The third
co-conspirator was declared unavailable based on his reliance on
his fifth amendment privilege.123 Inadi raised both evidentiary and
confrontation objections to the admission of the tapes. His strong-
est argument, and the one ultimately at issue before the Supreme
Court, involved the fourth co-conspirator, Lazaro, who after
having been subpoenaed to appear by the government, failed to
-11 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
- Bourjaily v. United States, - U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
,2 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
22 The applicable exception, referred to generally as the co-conspirator exception, is
codified in FED. R. EvD. 801(d)(2)(e). See supra note 36. In Inadi, the district court relied
on this exception to admit the statements-of Inadi's co-conspirators, concluding as required
by the exception, that the statements were made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy.
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390.
M2 In pertinent part, the fifth amendment provides, "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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appear, claiming car trouble. Inadi claimed that absent a showing
of unavailability, admission of Lazaro's statements violated his
confrontation rights. The trial court admitted the statements be-
cause they satisfied the co-conspirator rule that excludes such
statements from treatment as hearsay.'14
The Third Circuit reversed. Relying on language in Roberts,
12
the court of appeals concluded that as a prerequisite to the
admission of any out-of-court statement, the confrontation clause
required a non-testifying declarant to be unavailable. 126 Since car
trouble did not establish unavailability, the court of appeals found
admission of the tape recordings erroneous. 27 The Third Circuit's
reliance on this portion of Roberts, however, invited the Supreme
Court to respond as it did.
The Supreme Court considered the question to be whether the
confrontation clause requires a showing of unavailability as a
condition to admissibility of the out-of-court statements of a non-
testifying co-conspirator. To that question, the Court responded
that the confrontation clause imposes no such requirement. Had
the answer stopped here, neither it nor the decision it compelled
would have been inaccurate, for California v. Green'2 had already
approved the admission of hearsay when the declarant was pro-
duced for cross-examination. The defect in the Inadi opinion is
that instead of merely stating that the Third Circuit was wrong
in its reason for overturning the trial court, the Court implied
that the trial court was right in allowing an available declarant's
hearsay statement to be admitted without requiring that the de-
clarant be produced.
129
'11 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 390. In Lee, 476 U.S. at 543, the Court suggested that the
confrontation clause was designed to prevent conviction of a defendant based on pre-
sumptively unreliable evidence. This is different from an affirmative requirement that
evidence be proved reliable whenever possible, that is, in all cases except where necessity
prevents such proof. In the former case presumptively reliable evidence is always admissible;
in the latter case, it would not be admissible, except where necessity required.
'' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. Concluding that the confrontation clause imposes a
preference for a face-to-face accusation, the Roberts Court stated that in the usual case,
hearsay declarants must be produced to be unavailable before their out-of-court statements
can be admitted. Id. at 65.
Inadi, 748 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
Id. at 819.
399 U.S. at 158.
, Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396-400.
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In rendering its opinion, the Inadi Court acknowledged that
Roberts had seemingly established a rule of necessity, requiring
"in the usual case" that the prosecution either produce or dem-
onstrate the unavailability of a declarant whose statement it wishes
to use against a defendant.1 30 The Inadi Court, however, rejected
this as a rule of general applicability and instead limited Roberts
to cases involving prior testimony. 3 1 On the one hand, as the
Court explained in its opinion, this limitation was appealing since
it is burdensome for the prosecution to have to keep track of
potential witnesses. Analytically, however, Inadi's limitation of
Roberts could never have been intended by the Roberts Court
itself. When Roberts was decided, introduction of prior testimony
was limited by evidentiary rules as well as by the Constitution to
situations where the declarant was neither produced nor available
to be produced. 32 In view of this, the Roberts Court could not
have intended to limit to prior testimony cases a statement that
defined as options producing or demonstrating the unavailability
of a declarant whose statement the prosecution wanted to intro-
duce. Notwithstanding this, Inadi limited Roberts, and in turn
freed itself to consider as persuasive only that part of Roberts
pertinent to cases involving prior testimony: the unavailability
requirement. Beyond its inclusion in the quoted passage, Inadi
ignored Roberts' production requirement entirely.133
Having thus limited Roberts, but acknowledging that it was
still good authority for cases involving prior testimony, the Court
then had only to explain why unavailability was required in cases
involving prior testimony but not in co-conspirator cases. In
resolving this issue, the Inadi Court ignored both Barber's and
Roberts' preference for face-to-face confrontation as well as the
'3 Id. at 392.
" Id. at 393.
"Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to questions not presented
in that case, but rather as a resolution of the issue the court said it was
examining: 'the constitutional propriety of the introduction in evidence of
the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness not produced at the defen-
dant's subsequent state criminal trial."'
Id. at 392-93 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58).
112 Barber v. Page had established the constitutional rule to this effect. Barber, 390
U.S. at 722. FED. R. Evin. 804(b)(1) typified a similar evidentiary requirement. See supra
notes 30 and 112.
"I See supra note 131.
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recognition by those cases that confrontation clause requirements
in cases of unavailable witnesses arose only because of the neces-
sity created by the declarant's unavailability. Instead the Court
reasoned that unavailability is required in the case of prior testi-
mony, not as a constitutionally approved substitute when produc-
tion is not possible, but rather because prior testimony is only a
weaker substitute for live testimony.
If the declarant is available and the same information can be
presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with
full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor
of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the
weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, appli-
cable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better
evidence.23
Elevating "better" evidence to constitutionally preferred status,
the Inadi Court thus concluded that co-conspirator evidence, cap-
tured as it is during the pendency of the illegal enterprise, is better
evidence than in-court testimony by the declarant. Accordingly,
in the Court's opinion admission of this "better" evidence actu-
ally furthers the confrontation clause's goal of enhancing the
search for truth.'35
'- Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. Whether the Court is correct in its assessment of what
evidence is "better" is debatable. The question need not be answered, though, because the
co-conspirator exception, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(e), unlike the prior testimony exception,
FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1), would not have required exclusion of Lazaro's testimony if he
had appeared. For the text of Rules 801(d)(2)(e) and 804(b)(1), see supra notes 36 and 30,
respectively.
W Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396. The Court also placed reliance on FED. R. Evm. 806,
which in pertinent part provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D),
or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may
be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would
be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness ....
If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the
declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement
as if under cross-examination.
It was the Court's belief that if the defendant had truly wanted to examine Lazaro, the
defendant could have called him himself, using as support the sixth amendment's compul-
sory process clause, which provides, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... " U.S.
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If the choice were solely between admitting or excluding the
evidence, Inadi's logic might be persuasive. Having found worth
in co-conspirator evidence, however, the Inadi Court made only
passing reference to the fact that production of Lazaro would
have had no impact upon the value of the tape-recorded evidence.
The problem was not an "either/or" proposition. The tapes could
have been admitted and Lazaro could have been produced.
Although Inadi had finally provided the Court with the op-
portunity to decide whether the confrontation clause required the
production of available witnesses, the Court's negative answer to
that question left uncertain the other prong of confrontation
clause analysis: the standards for measuring reliability. Douglas
and Bruton had given defendants a constitutional right of cross-
examination. 136 Where the out-of-court statement had not been
cross-examined when made, Inadi rendered improbable, because
not constitutionally required, any cross-examination at trial. Not
CONST. amend. VI. The compulsory process clause was held applicable to the states in
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). The Inadi Court's assumption, however,
presumes that the government's compliance with the compulsory process clause satisfies
the confrontation clause. See generally Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process:
A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HAzv. L. REV. 567, 588 (1978)
(arguing that the obligation of the state is the same in both clauses). Cf. Baker, supra
note 47, at 534 (confrontation clause must mean more than the right to call witnesses
because that right is already provided by the compulsory process clause). The better answer
is that the confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause are different. The
former gives the defendant a right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The
latter provides assistance in securing the presence of those witnesses the defendant wants
to present. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 408 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The possibility that the
confrontation clause's provisions differ from those of the compulsory process clause is
particularly evident because under FED. R. EviD. 806 any rebuttal by a defendant must
await the conclusion of the prosecution's case, a time lapse that can be quite substantial.
In addition, by being forced to call the witness himself, the defendant risks appearing as
though he is bolstering the very allegations he wishes to refute. The fact that Rule 806
permits questioning as if on cross-examination does not mean that the purpose will be
achieved or the adverse relationship appreciated by the jury. "'[O]nly a lawyer without
trial experience would suggest that the limited right to impeach one's own witness is the
equivalent of that right to immediate cross-examination which has always been regarded
as the greatest safeguard of American trial procedure."' Inadi, 475 U.S. at 410 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting New York Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 305 (D.C.
Cir. 1945)). Moreover, Rule 806 pertains only to hearsay. Statements under Rule 801 are
not hearsay. FED. R. EviD. 801(d). For a discussion of the problems this creates, see
generally S. Saltzburg and K. Redden, FEDERAL Rux-s OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 994-95 (4th
ed. 1986).
136 See supra notes 68, 81 and accompanying text.
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surprisingly, the strain created by these competing principles did
not take long for the Court to resolve.
Lee v. Illinois137' involved the admission of and reliance by the
court on a co-defendant's uncross-examined confession against
the defendant in their joint murder trial.13 8 Neither defendant
testified at trial. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge's
reliance on the co-defendant's confession as evidence against the
defendant violated the defendant's confrontation clause rights,
though for reasons different from those advanced in the earlier
Bruton case.139 Moreover, characterizing the right of confrontation
as primarily a functional right, designed to promote reliability in
criminal trials, the Lee Court laid the groundwork for the destruc-
tion of Douglas by stating that even hearsay not falling under a
traditional exception, and thus presumptively unreliable, can be
sufficiently reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause if it pos-
sesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.Y4 Though it
declined to enumerate what guarantees of trustworthiness might
or might not suffice, the Court by'example referred to cross-
examination "or its equivalent,"' 141 implying for the first time that
cross-examination might no longer be an exclusive measure of
reliability.
Three weeks after Lee, the Court escaped from the comer
into which it had painted itself. Remanding a case for reconsid-
eration in light of its recently announced opinion in Lee, the
Court in New Mexico v. Earnest'42 made clear what Inadi had
required and Lee had set in motion: "mo the extent that Douglas
v. Alabama interpreted the confrontation clause as requiring an
opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admission of a co-
defendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no longer good
law."' 143 If, then, the confrontation clause does not require an
available declarant to be produced, and a defendant has no
t Lee, 476 U.S. 530.
" Id. at 531.
,' The Court ruled in Lee that the confessions were insufficiently interlocking. Id. at
546. For an explanation of the concept of interlocking confessions, see supra note 81.
" Lee, 476 U.S. at 543.
1', Id.
1,2 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam), on remand, 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 284 (1987).
1,3 Id. at 649.
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constitutional right of cross-examination, what constraints does
the confrontation clause impose on the introduction of hearsay?
Just short of a year after New Mexico v. Earnest, the Court
decided Bourjaily v. United States.144 Like Inadi, Bourjaily in-
volved the admission of a non-testifying co-conspirator's state-
ments. Concluding that the particular statements were
constitutionally admitted, the Court summarized its perceptions
of the confrontation clause's requirements. According to the
Bourjaily Court, the confrontation clause requirement that hear-
say be conditioned on both the unavailability of the declarant and
the indicia of reliability surrounding the out-of-court statement is
a general requirement only. 45 Referring to Inadi, the Court then
continued: "[We held [in InadiJ that the first of these two
generalized inquiries, unavailability, was not required when the
hearsay statement is the out-of-court declaration of a co-conspir-
ator. Today, we conclude that the second inquiry, independent
indicia of reliability, is also not mandated by the Constitution." ,46
D. The Difficulty with the Court's Solution
At one level, the Court's recent approach and what it might
bode for the future are appealing. Indeed, "[a] defendant is
entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."1 47 Admitting hearsay
that is valuable in its own right so long as its evidentiary reliability
is firmly rooted, irrespective of the availability of the declarant,
is an attractive approach in that it appears to accomplish the
goals underlying the confrontation clause. In other words, if the
purpose of the confrontation clause was to prevent convictions
based on untested, and therefore unreliable, out-of-court evidence,
admission of valuable and presumptively reliable evidence would
seem consistent with this purpose. Moreover, this approach has
practical appeal. If availability is immaterial, the prosecutor is
free from the burden of identifying, locating, and ensuring the
continuing availability of declarants for trial. In addition, because
the statements would be admissible regardless of whether the
- U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
I d. at 2782.
'' Id.
147 Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135 (quoting Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
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declarants were produced or unavailable, these decisions in no
way compromise, through the exclusion of evidence, the truth-
seeking function of the confrontation clause.'s
On the other hand, if the purpose of the confrontation clause
is to promote confrontation because confrontation is the consti-
tutionally preferred vehicle by which to demonstrate a witness'
credibility and thereby ultimately to test the reliability of all that
person's assertions (those seen or done as well as those said or
heard), then the Court's recent approach leaves a portion of the
clause unfulfilled. Moreover, the possibility that these decisions
can be expanded is great. The logic that led the Inadi Court to
conclude that co-conspirator statements constitute valuable evi-
dence is the logic underlying most, if not all, of the exclusions
and exceptions to the federal hearsay rule.149 This is particularly
troublesome given the fact that exclusions, unlike exceptions, are
not rooted in reliability. Moreover, since Bourjaily considers con-
"' This aspect of the confrontation clause was discussed in Evans, 400 U.S. at 89,
and re-emphasized in Inadi, 475 U.S. at 396.
"I The exclusions and exceptions in Rules 801 and 803 now number 32. See FED. R.
EviD. 801 and 803. "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. This means that
if all hearsay exceptions possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, then Inadi
applies to all hearsay exceptions. On the other hand, if hearsay exceptions must be evaluated
to see if they possess sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to pass constitutional muster,
then uncertainty will surely prevail as lower courts, and particularly state courts, attempt
to decide which exceptions are reliable enough to satisfy what are only vague constitutional
standards; see, e.g., Inadi, 475 U.S. at 401 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The notion that
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness can provide sufficient indicia of reliability to
satisfy the confrontation clause was reaffirmed in Lee, 476 U.S. at 543 (sufficiently
interlocking co-defendant confession may be admitted despite lack of opportunity for cross-
examination); see also Earnest, 477 U.S. 648; cf. J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1422, at
253-54 (emerging hearsay exceptions do not reflect uniformity in the degree of trustwor-
thiness the circumstances presuppose). Interestingly, Justice Blackman, who wrote the
opinion in Roberts and who joined the opinion in Inadi, argued in dissent in Lee that the
case was controlled by Roberts and that the co-defendant confession was constitutionally
admissible only if the confessor were unavailable and the confession bore a sufficient
indicia of reliability. Lee, 476 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The only distinction
between Lee and Inadi is that Inadi involved a recognized hearsay exception of presumptive
reliability while Lee involved a co-defendant confession, not presumptively reliable. This,
however, allows the constitutional provision to rise and fall on the presumptive quality of
evidence, not on the availability of the declarant to submit to cross-examination, a
procedure that would prove whether or not the statement was reliable. The Court in Lee,
however, specifically declined to address the issue of the confessor's availability. Lee, 476
U.S. at 539.
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stitutionally admissible any statement that falls within a firmly-
rooted exception, which according to the court essentially means
an "old" exception, the Court has effectively foreclosed from
consideration any evidence that a particular statement is untrus-
tworthy by depriving the defendant of the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant.
Because the Court's approach fails to hold true to the full
meaning of confrontation, because it disregards the wisdom of
the Court's earlier opinions, and because it has the potential of
eventually rendering constitutional any hearsay exception of suf-
ficient age to be "firmly rooted," an alternative approach to
harmonizing the confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions
is necessary.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Relying as it does on evidentiary presumptions of reliability
rather than on reliability proven, or indeed disproven, through
confrontation, the Court's current approach should be aban-
doned. In its place, the Court should adopt a definition of the
confrontation clause that at a minimum requires the production
of hearsay declarants when they are available.' 50 Such a rule has
00 This idea is not new. It was suggested by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion
in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970), though repudiated the next term in his
concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970). This specific issue, as
well as that of the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule in
general has also sparked a great deal of comment by legal scholars. For a representative
sample, see the list of authorities collected in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-67 n.9
(1980) and in Natali, supra note 68, at 47 n.25. See generally Arenson, supra note 48;
Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional Unavaila-
bility Requirement, 70 Mn4N. L. Rv. 665, 669 n.21 (1986); Mauet, Prior Identifications
in Criminal Cases: Hearsay and Confrontation Issues, 24 Aiuz. L. R-v. 29 (1982); Note,
The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: A Problematic Relationship in Need of
a Practical Analysis, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 949 (1987); Note, Confrontation and the
Unavailable Witness: Searching for a Standard, 18 VAL. U.L. Rav. 193 (1983). The
suggested approach, that available hearsay declarants be produced, is meant in no way to
impact upon the Court's earlier rulings that where witnesses are unavailable the out-of-
court statement must meet a constitutional standard of reliability. In fact, the proposed
approach follows directly from that jurisprudence, by elevating to a constitutional rule of
preference in cases of no necessity the very measures the Court repeatedly employed in
cases where there was necessity. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70; Green, 399 U.S. at
165; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
407 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1985). But cf. Natali, supra note
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several benefits. The change would better reflect the true meaning
of the confrontation clause; it would give due respect to precedent;
and finally, the change appropriately respects the overarching
purpose of the sixth amendment.
A. The Change Better Reflects the True Meaning of the
Confrontation Clause
The core of the confrontation clause is its grant to defendants
of a literal right to "confront" the witnesses against them.' The
framers preferred face-to-face confrontation to ensure: 1) that the
witness will give his statement under oath; 2) that the witness will
be forced to submit to cross-examination; and 3) that the trier of
fact will be permitted to observe the witness' demeanor while
testifying. 1" 2 Confrontation can occur, however, only when a wit-
ness is available and is produced. Exceptions should only be
considered when necessity makes confrontation impossible.
68, at 64 (the ability to cross-examine does nothing to prevent the jury from hearing an
unreliable statement in the first instance); J. WiGIolE, supra note 22 § 1397, at 158-59.
Wigmore argued that because there was no common law right to an indispensable thing
called confrontation as distinguished from cross-examination, the right of confrontation is
really a right of cross-examination. The right of cross-examination, in turn, is the right to
have the hearsay rule enforced. Because the hearsay rule already had several exceptions,
contra F. HEI R, supra note 26, at 22-24, Wigmore's position was that "[t]he rule
sanctioned by the Constitution is the hearsay rule as to cross-examination, with all the
exceptions that may legitimately be found, developed or created therein." J. WIOMoRE,
supra note 22, at 158-59. Accordingly, the confrontation clause restricts only the form of
proceedings, not their content. For a criticism of wigmore's position, see Graham, supra
note 24, at 104 n.24. For the proposition that the tension between the confrontation clause
and the hearsay rule should be resolved through a due process analysis instead of a
confrontation clause analysis, see Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer,
380 U.S. at 410 (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally Westen, The Future of Confron-
tation, 77 MIcK. L. Ri-v. 1185, 1199 (1978-79).
"I Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62-63; Green, 399 U.S. at 157 (the literal right to confront
the witness forms the core of the values of the confrontation clause).
'- Green, 399 U.S. at 158. The benefit of an oath impresses the witness with the
seriousness of the process and guards against falsehoods by the penalty for perjury. The
benefit of cross-examination lies in the court's acceptance of its role as the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note 22,
§ 1367, at 32). And the benefit of allowing the jury to observe the witness' demeanor lies
in assisting the factfimder in the evaluation of the witness' credibility. Green, 399 U.S. at
158. But cf. Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAu L. REv. 1, 8-22 (1970) (demeanor
evidence may in fact lead astray the finder of fact).
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The pre-eminence of confrontation over alternative indicia of
reliability is obvious yet elusive. Admittedly, the goal of confron-
tation is reliability. Equally clear is the fact that the right of cross-
examination furthers confrontation clause values because of its
ability to test reliability.'5 3 Although the history surrounding the
adoption of the confrontation clause is sparse, a strong argument
exists that the framers wanted face-to-face confrontation because
it promoted reliability, not merely as a incidental measure of
reliability. Courts and scholars agree that
[t]he primary object of the constitutional provision in question
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief. 54
This description acknowledges that confrontation is more than
simply cross-examination. Yet, because cross-examination is such
an effective way to test reliability 55 and because many of the
"53 "No one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the
value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of
a criminal case." Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
-, 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Green, 399 U.S. at 157-58; Bruton,
391 U.S. at 126; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
'11 Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242, cited with approval in Barber, 390 U.S. at 721; Arenson,
supra note 48, at 16 n.5; Baker, supra note 47, at 541.
Ms "[Clonfrontation and cross-examination of the declarant in open court are the
most trusted guarantors of the reliability that is the primary concern of the Confrontation
Clause." United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 403 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). "There
are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-
examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which
is this country's constitutional goal." Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405. Cross-examination is "one
of the safeguards essential to a fair trial." Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692
(1931). "A lawyer can do anything with a cross-examination-if he is skillful enough not
to impale his own cause upon it." J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1367, at 32. The
importance of cross-examination is also underscored by the Court's recognition that even
pre-trial events can impermissibly restrict cross-examination at trial. See, e.g., Wade v.
United States, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (sixth amendment right to counsel applicable to
[VOL. 77
1988-891 HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
early cases involved prior testimony which by definition includes
cross-examination, the Court's perception of cross-examination as
coextensive with confrontation is easy to understand.5 6 Eventu-
ally, however, and for good reason, the Court reconsidered this
perception. Cross-examination was not, after all, the chosen lan-
guage of the framers. Moreover, the admissibility of dying dec-
larations remained inconsistent with a constitutional right of cross-
examination. And, a general constitutional right of cross-exami-
nation would have rendered unconstitutional many of the tradi-
tional exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Constitutional distress flowed from the changes wrought by
the Court's reconsideration of the role of cross-examination. The
Court's reconsideration did not distinguish between the role, and
hence value, of cross-examination at trial and its role and value
when done at the time of the making of the statement. Nor did
the Court distinguish between the role and value of cross-exami-
nation where confrontation was possible and its role and value
where confrontation was not possible.
In New Mexico v. Earnest'5 7 the Court ruled that cross-ex-
amination is not constitutionally required in all cases. That case
involved a declarant specifically found unavailable by the court
because of the declarant's refusal to testify based on the fifth
amendment.'58 The Court's recognition that cross-examination is
not required in that circumstance represented a return to the
Roberts rule of necessity. Where the declarant is not available,
necessity may permit the admission of hearsay so long as there is
some manner for the defendant to evaluate the adverse evidence.' 59
As for years had been the case with dying declarations, that
evaluation may be satisfied by the circumstances surrounding the
pretrial lineup procedure in order to give meaning to the confrontation clause right of
cross-examination at trial); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (statute restricting
access to prosecution witness' juvenile criminal record effectively denied defendant the
opportunity for cross-examination guaranteed by the sixth amendment).
"I See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Bruton, 391
U.S. at 126; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965); Natali, supra note 68, at 50.
'- 477 U.S. 648 (1986) (per curiam), on remand, 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 284 (1987).
I" State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872, 875 (N.M. 1985), cert. granted, 474 U.S. 918
(1985).
"I Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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making of the statement, providing "indicia of," or presumptive,
reliability.
Where, however, the declarant is available, making trial con-
frontation and cross-examination possible, the value of cross-
examination is greater. Gone is the necessity of determining al-
ternative means to evaluate adverse evidence. By the simple ex-
pedient of requiring possible confrontation to be actual
confrontation, the original purpose of both the confrontation
clause and its progeny, the rule of necessity, can be achieved. The
Court's decisions, however, appear oblivious to the distinction
between cross-examination as a suitable but not exclusive gauge
of reliability in cases of unavailability and cross-examination as
an integral part of confrontation in cases where availability of
the witness makes confrontation possible. Accordingly, once the
Court devalued cross-examination in cases of unavailability, the
step to a similar devaluation in cases of availability was inevitable.
In truth, however, presumptively reliable hearsay can never
duplicate the trier of fact's response to an individual witness'
demeanor. It cannot accommodate the infinite circumstances sur-
rounding the making of any particular statement.160 Nor can it
ever hope to substitute for the motivation and possible ammuni-
tion of a defendant in cross-examining a witness as to the veracity
of that witness' assertions. 161 For this reason a rule requiring the
'60 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 1368, at 37 (The first utility of cross-examination
is the extraction of circumstances surrounding the" making of the statement which are
known to the witness but were not disclosed on direct examination); accord Green, 399
U.S. at 201-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the reliability of a statement can be influenced
by the circumstances surrounding its making as well as by subsequent events). For example,
suppose that just as in Inadi the prosecution had a tape recording of a conversation
between alleged robbery co-conspirators. Suppose further, that unlike Inadi, one of the
co-conspirators was heard to say, "Why don't you take a car?" The fact that that statement
was not an order to a co-conspirator to steal a car, but rather was directed to some
unheard third person setting out to walk somewhere, could never be demonstrated by
listening to the tape alone. Nor is Rule 806, which permits a hearsay declarant to be
examined as an adverse witness, a satisfactory response. See supra note 135.
6I Cross-examination not only casts doubt on whether the statement was made,
Douglas, 380 U.S. at 420, and, if made, what was meant by the statement under the
circumstances, but can also reveal bias, motive, and other inclination to falsify.
Conspirators' declarations are good to prove that some conspiracy exists but
less trustworthy to show its aims and membership. The conspirator's interest
is likely to lie in misleading the listener into believing the conspiracy stronger
with more members (and different members) and other alms than in fact it
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production of available witnesses would better reflect the true
meaning of the confrontation clause.
B. The Change Better Respects the Court's Precedent
Despite the fact that the years have witnessed the Court
struggle to define the constitutional significance of cross-exami-
nation, the Court's emphasis on cross-examination has been mis-
placed. From Mattox to Roberts, the Court repeated the fact that
the confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation. As such, confrontation is greater than cross-ex-
amination. Confrontation affords the sole opportunity not just
for the witness to testify under oath, not just to require the
witness to submit to cross-examination, but perhaps most impor-
tantly, to permit the finder of fact to determine, by looking into
the face of the accuser, whether that person is, ultimately, worthy
of belief. The Court's current approach severely restricts that
preference. A rule requiring the production of available witnesses,
requiring only a return to Roberts, would more meaningfully defer
to the Court's own precedent.
EPLoGUE: THE CHANGE RESPECTS THE OVERARCHING PuRPOsE
oF THE SIxTH AmENDMENT
Thus far, this Article has argued that a rule conditioning
hearsay on the production of available witnesses would give better
meaning to the confrontation clause. Distinct yet additional jus-
tification exists in the recognition that such a rule would advance
the goals of the sixth amendment as a whole. In other areas of
criminal jurisprudence, either explicitly or implicitly, the Supreme
Court has identified values that compel a result in a particular
case even though the chosen values may not promote reliability.
In defense of these values, a factually accurate result is often
has. It is no victory for common sense to make a belief that criminals are
notorious for their veracity the basis for law.
Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1165-66 (1954), quoted in Inadi,
475 U.S. at 404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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sacrificed. 16 2 Just as the Court has respected the values encom-
passed by other constitutional provisions, so too should it respect
the purpose of the sixth amendment. A rule requiring the pro-
duction of available witnesses, with its added benefit of promoting
instead of defeating reliability, would ensure this respect.
A. The Court's Approach in Other Areas
Decisions regarding unconstitutional searches and seizures are
prime examples of situations where the Court discounted reliabil-
ity in favor of an approach designed to vindicate other values. In
the landmark decision of Mapp v. Ohio,163 the Court ruled that
"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court."' 64 By ex-
162 For purposes of this article, a factually accurate result is one that flows from the
facts, as, for example, when a person who committed a crime is convicted of that crime.
For a discussion of these terms and "process values" in general, see generally
Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea For "'Process Values," 60
CoRumi L. Ra,. 1, 27-29 (1974).
16 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'1' Id. at 655. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court held that
in a federal prosecution the fourth amendment barred the use of evidence secured through
an illegal search and seizure. Id. at 392. Thirty-five years later the Court was confronted
with the question of whether illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in a state trial as
well. There, in Wolf v. People of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court refused to
extend the exclusionary rule to a state court. It held that "in a prosecution in a State
court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. at 33. Accordingly, the
Court would not apply the exclusionary rule to the states. Since "most of the English-
speaking world does not regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus
obtained, ... [the Court] ... hesitate[d] to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of
the right .... ," leaving the states to develop their own remedy. Id. at 29. Noting one fault
of the exclusionary rule, and adding ammunition to the argument of those justices who
would later advocate eradicating the rule almost entirely, the Court stated, that "[i]ndeed,
the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon
whose person or premises something incriminating has been found." Id. at 30-31. The
Court thus hinted at the rule's cost to reliability, since, as was later argued, physical
evidence is typically reliable. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 497 (1976) (Burger, J.,
dissenting). The exclusion of such reliable evidence not only obviously detracts from
reliability, but forces a seemingly erroneous result, acquittal. The exclusionary rule, there-
fore, must exist for reasons other than reliability, and, indeed, in Mapp v. Ohio, the
rationale crystallizes.
Mapp explicitly overruled Wolf. In Mapp, the defendant was convicted of knowingly
having in her possession obscene material. Relying on a tip, the police went to defendant's
house to question her concerning a suspect wanted for questioning concerning a recent
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tending the exclusionary rule' 65 to the states, Mapp emphasized
the importance of individuals' rights to privacy. 166 The practical
effect of the exclusion doctrine on results makes apparent the
importance of the values behind it: convictions are sacrificed 67 in
the interests of individual security and deterrence of future abuses.
Notwithstanding the Court's recent retreat in this area,1s6 the
bombing. When the police demanded entry, on advice of counsel the defendant refused,
unless a warrant was produced. Using force, the police gained entry to the house, hand-
cuffed Ms. Mapp and searched all floors, eventually finding the obscene material. Mapp,
367 U.S. at 643-46. Overruling Wolf, the Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained
through an unreasonable search and seizure was inadmissible, stating that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, ... inadmissible in
a state court." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
'" The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The exclusionary rule, which makes evidence obtained in violation
of the amendment inadmissible against a defendant in court, is a judicially-created remedy
for violation of the amendment. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648-56; Weeks, 232 U.S. 383.
'6 "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property . . . ." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646-47
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). The Court elaborated by stating
that freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from convictions
based upon coerced confessions express "supplementing phases of the same constitutional
purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy." Id. at 657. The Court
reasoned that if the police knew that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment was inadmissible, they would desist from its violation, and the Court concluded that
the purpose of the rule was deterrence. Id. at 656. Deterrence is, therefore, a purpose of
the rule; it is not a value in itself. Maintaining judicial integrity, ostensibly a value (like
privacy), though initially a purpose of the rule, is no longer thought to justify the rule.
'7 In the Court's words, it is a sacrifice of a "shortcut to conviction." Id. at 660.
"Shortcut" obviously refers to the ease with which evidence can be obtained when gathered
in violation of the fourth amendment to convict an individual, as opposed to the difficulty
that would be encountered by obtaining a search warrant from a judge.
'" Admittedly, the rule has been narrowed over the years. See, e.g., Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (denying retroactive effect); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969) (limiting standing to those whose rights were violated by the search itself
not those who are aggrieved by the introduction of damaging evidence); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (precluding refusal to answer questions of grand jury on
ground that evidence was obtained illegally); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976)
(exclusionary rule is not extended to exclude from civil tax proceeding evidence obtained
illegally by a criminal law enforcement agent); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(creating a good faith exception to the applicability of the rule).
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exclusionary rule decisions confirm that the values underlying the
rule remain more important than convicting even the factually
guilty.
Similarly, cases involving involuntary confessions represent
instances where the Court has been willing to sacrifice factually-
based results for the sake of an important value, in this situation
represented as "due process fairness."'' 69 Although coerced con-
fessions are distrusted on the theory that coercion renders the
resulting confession inherently untrustworthy, 1
70
[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.'
71
Thus, despite the recognition that coerced confessions frequently
lack trustworthiness, it is apparent that the constitutional prohi-
bition against their use seeks also to fulfill a "complex of val-
ues. " 117 2
'1 See, eg., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Due process of law,
as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these
standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about
by methods that offend 'a sense of justice."').
170 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
171 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). In fact, an essential factor in
overruling an earlier case, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), was its sole reliance
on the lack of reliability as a basis for excluding involuntary confessions. See Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384-87 (1964). As the Court stated in Blackburn, "[Tihere are
considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence .... []mportant human
values are sacrificed ... where an agency ... wrings a confession out of the accused
against his will." Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206.
172 Blackburn" 361 U.S. at 207. Determining that the New York procedure which
allowed the jury to determine both voluntariness of a confession and guilt did not
adequately protect the defendant's right to be free from conviction based upon a coerced
confession, the Court, in Jackson, 378 U.S. 368, re-emphasized important values. Inter-
estingly, the jury which decides guilt is prohibited from determining voluntariness because
of the risk that it will find the defendant guilty because it believes that the confession was
truthful even though involuntary due to the "infection of impermissible considerations."
Id. at 392-94. Thus, the Court was explicitly willing to sacrifice truthfulness and reliability-
results-for the sake of a "complex of values" threatened by the use of a coerced
confession. In fact, Madison himself said that part of the overall purpose of the Bill of
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In effectuating the right to a speedy trial, 73 the Court has
identified the values in that constitutional provision and has been
willing to sacrifice factually-based results to serve those values.
According to the Court, the speedy trial guarantee "is an impor-
tant safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior
to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair
the ability of the accused to defend himself."' 74 In view of this,
the Court has acknowledged that where the guarantee has been
violated, dismissal of the case is required even though it means
that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go
free without ever having had a trial.' 75
B. The Values of the Sixth Amendment
Where the Court has identified values inherent in certain
constitutional provisions, it has defended those values even despite
some cost. As is true of specific constitutional provisions, the
sixth amendment as a whole has a value. That value is balance. 176
In providing rights to criminal defendants, the framers pre-
scribed the process to be followed before government could de-
prive a citizen of that person's liberty. That process was not
defined descriptively. Rather, the sixth amendment recites a list
of specific rights belonging to criminal defendants.'7 As such, the
Rights was to offer "tranquility of the public mind." R. RuTLAND, Tim BrTH OF Tim
Brrr oF Ricars 202 (1955). For the proposition that the confrontation clause serves a
similar "complex of values," see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 539 (1986).
"' U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See infra note 177 for the text of the sixth amendment.
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
"' Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). "Such a remedy is more serious than
an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy." Id.
at 522 (emphasis added).
,76 "The fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights
reflects the belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that confrontation was
a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
I" In its entirety, the sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have corn-
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amendment symbolizes a shield between the accuser and the ac-
cused. And as a shield, the amendment represents a considered
balance, the disturbance of which undermines the aim of the
amendment.
In contemplating the meaning of the confrontation clause, the
Court should be as conscientious about guarding the sixth amend-
ment's goal of balance as it has been about preserving the values
underlying other constitutional provisions. The right of confron-
tation is an explicit part of the sixth amendment equation. Effec-
tuating that provision should both reflect and respect that equation.
Instead, the Court has recently ruled that admitting hearsay evi-
dence of merely presumptive reliability offends neither the con-
frontation clause nor the amendment as a whole. Taken literally,
this excuses confrontation where it would otherwise be possible,
effectively consigning a defendant's right to be confronted with
adverse witnesses to a privilege dependent upon prosecutorial
beneficence.
Permitting hearsay of an available but not produced declarant
prevents the defendant from testing the reliability of that evidence.
This, in turn, allows the prosecution to admit and represent as
reliable evidence only presumed reliable. Freedom to rely on
evidence of presumed reliability is easier for the prosecution than
would be either keeping track of hearsay declarants or risking
proof that the declarant's hearsay statement was not, in fact,
reliable. This makes the prosecutor's job easier. By creating what
is a clear evidentiary advantage for the prosecution, the Court
has realigned the respective positions of the parties. The result is
that the equipoise of the sixth amendment is disturbed, inappro-
priately and intolerably.
CONCLUSION
Participating in the building of the form and process that
would become America, our forebears chose to give an accused
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In
contrast to other rights that created a more revolutionary change
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence [sic].
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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on the relationship between the people and their government, the
confrontation clause was the focus of little debate and even less
attention. As a result, its true meaning continues to be refined.
The Court has recently decided that a defendant's right to
confront adverse witnesses does not require the production of
available witnesses nor that the witness' out-of-court statement be
required to be any more reliable than within the bounds of a
"firmly-rooted" evidentiary hearsay exception. This Article has
suggested that though inevitable, and perhaps even understanda-
ble, the Court's recent decisions in this area have not been wise.
They have not been true to the Court's precedent. They have not
fulfilled the preference of the framers. And the decisions can be
easily extended to virtually all of the hearsay exceptions given a
sufficient passage of time.
178
In contrast, this Article has offered an explanation of how
the Court has come to its recent position as a means of defending
a return to its earlier jurisprudence. Ohio v. Roberts179 stands as
the Court's own confrontation clause stop sign. Unlike the speed-
ing motorist, the Court can undo its transgression. A rule requir-
ing the production of available witnesses would represent a return
to and respect for the law. It would give better meaning to the
sixth amendment, would better serve the preferences of the fram-
ers, and would restore equipoise to the sixth amendment. It should
be adopted.
,71 See supra note 149.
' 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

